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PLANT CLOSINGS AND ERISA'S
NONINTERFERENCE PROVISIONf
DANA M. MUIR*
XYZ, Inc. has experienced a decrease in sales and a corresponding
decrease in profits. In order to remain solvent, XYZ's board of directors
decides to close one of its three manufacturing plants. Because the
plants were opened at different times, the average ages and average
seniority levels of employees vary significantly among the plants, result-
ing in differing levels of employee benefit costs, especially with respect
to pensidn costs.'
This scenario has been repeated numerous times in recent years
as United States industry has struggled with recession and increased
world-wide competition. Many companies continue to downsize even
as the economic outlook improves. 2
 At the same time, some employers
t Copyright © 1995 Dana M. Muir.
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tion.
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For an explanation of Itow pension costs increase with the age and years of service of the
employee, see infra text accompanying notes 52-56. Special pension plans that award additional
benefits on the attainment of some combination of age and service also increase pension costs
for older and longer service employees. For example, USX Corporation's "Magic Number" plan
and Clark Equipment Company's "30 and out" and "85 point" systems are discussed infra at notes
81 and 106 and accompanying text.
2
 Frank Swohoda, U.S. Companies Speed Pace of Downsizing, WAs0. POST, Feb. 9, 1994, at C6;
Eric Reguly, Corporate Downsizing Continues Apace, FIN. PosT, July 14, 1993, § I, at 5; U.S.
Companies Take Hatchet to Jobs Again, L.A. Tim vs, July 9, 1993, at 1)3.
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are attempting to decrease the costs of their employee benefit plans,
not infrequently resulting in lawsuits under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") . s For example, some employers
have reduced or eliminated retiree health care coverage. 4 Others have
instituted dollar limitations on medical coverage for certain diseases
such as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"). 5 And at
least 50,000 small businesses terminated or froze their defined benefit
pension plans6 between 1988 and 1993. 7
An employer might wish to consider employee benefit costs when
making a plant closing decision. However, ERISA section 5108 ("section
510") prohibits specified actions against employees' and their bene-
ficiaries° in retaliation for exercising benefit rights or in order to
prevent employees" from becoming entitled to benefits. Thus, section
510 must be considered at the intersection of the decision to close a
plant and the increased attention focused on employee benefit costs."
3 Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") §§ 1-4402, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
4 See, e.g., Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 18 F.3d 1034, 1036 (3d Cir. 1994), petition
for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3844 (U.S. June 1, 1994) (No. 93-1935); UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716
F.2d 1476, 1478 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007 (1984); infra note 58 and accompa-
nying text.
5 See, e.g., McGann v, H Sc H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 482 (1992). The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(Supp. IV 1992), may preclude these types of dollar caps. See EEOC v. Mason Tenders' Dist.
Council Welfare Fund, No. 93-3865 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 9, 1993).
For a definition of the term "defined benefit pension plans," see infra text accompanying
notes 38-41.
7 Small Firms Lead Exit from Defined Benefit Pension Plans According to Enrolled Actuaries, 5
Benefits Coordinator—Employee Benefits Alert (WGL) 1 9 (Mar. 3l, 1993).
ERISA § 510 ("§ 510"), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
9 Technically, the statutory reference is to "participants." See infra text accompanying note
92 for the exact language of § 510. ERISA defines "participant" to mean employees and certain
other individuals who are eligible, or may become eligible in the future, for benefits from an
employee benefit plan. ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1988). Because of the context of plant
closings, this Article generally refers to § 510's prohibitions as running against the employer;
however, the statute actually applies to "any person." ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988); see,
e.g., Custer v. Pan Am. Lile Ins. Co., 12 F.3(1 410, 421 (4th Cir. 1993).
USA beneficiary is "a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of an employee
benefit plan who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder." ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(8) (1988).
11 While the first clause of § 510, which protects the exercise of benefits, covers both partici-
pants and beneficiaries, the second clause, which protects against interference with the attain-
ment of benefits, explicitly covers only participants. See infra text accompanying note 92 for the
relevant language of § 510. The legislative history does not explain this difference in coverage,
and it is unclear whether the asymmetry was intentional or the result of a drafting error.
12 For examples of other employment-related statutory provisions that regulate plant closings,
see, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992); Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
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This Article examines the implications of section 510 for an em-
ployer making a plant closing decision." Part I presents an overview of
ERISA, explains relevant concepts of private employee benefit plans,"
and reviews Unida v. Levi Strauss & CO' and Pickering v. USX Corp.,''
two recent cases where plaintiffs alleged that plant closings violated
section 510. Part II asks whether section 510 even applies to plant
closing decisions or whether it applies only to individualized employ-
ment decisions. Part II concludes that section 510 does apply to plant
closing decisions. Part III turns to an examination of the types of
benefits protected by section 510, focusing on the controversy over
whether section 510 protects more than an employee's initial right to
become vested in benefits. Part IV reviews the prima facie case and
allocation of the burdens of proof applicable to section 510 plant
closing cases and ends with a brief discussion of the remedies available
to plan participants after the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Mertens
v. Hewitt Associates.' 7
I. AN OVERVIEW OF ERISA AND FUNDAMENTALS
For purposes of this Article, it is unnecessary to undertake a
detailed exploration of the intricacies of ERISA. However, the overview
of ERISA and explanation of concepts provided below are indispensable
to understanding the application of section 510 to plant closing deci-
sions. This Part ends with a discussion of two recent plant closing cases.
A. An Overview of ERISA
Plant closings were not beyond the experience of ERISA's drafters.
In fact, a plant closing may have been the final straw which convinced
Congress of the necessity of pension reform. In 1963, Studebaker
Corporation closed its automobile plant in South Rend, Indiana. As a
result of that closing, thousands of employees lost their jobs. More
importantly for future pension regulation, due to the underfunding of
the Studebaker pension plan, 6,900 employees lost some or all of their
promised pension benefits." The widespread deprivation of pension
13 Similar considerations apply to sourcing and other production decisions. See infra text
accompanying notes 116-19 for a discussion of the tactics employed by Continental Can Co.
14
 Public pension and welfare plans arc exempt from Titles 1 and IV of ERISA. ER1SA
§§ 4(b) (1), 4021(b) (2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b) (1), 1321(b) (2) (1988).
15 986 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1993).
16 809 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Utah 1992).
17 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
1 " Private Pension Plans, 1966: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Polity of the Joint
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benefits inspired Congress to investigate the general lack of security
for private pension plans. 19
After more than ten years of legislative hearings and congressional
debate, President Gerald R. Ford signed ERISA into law on Labor Day,
1974. 29
 ERISA provides for comprehensive regulation of pension and
welfare benefit plans. 2 ' According to its declaration of policy, Congress
enacted ERISA to protect employees' rights to collect benefits prom-
ised by existing benefit plans. Congress also hoped ERISA would en-
courage employers to expand the number and coverage of pension
benefit plans.22
Congress divided ERISA into four titles. Title I includes section
510.25
 In addition, Title I contains definitions and establishes require-
ments for: reporting and disclosure; 24
 participation and vesting; 25 fund-
ing; 2" fiduciary responsibility; 27
 administration and enforcement; 28 and
continuation coverage under group health plans. 29 Title II sets forth
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"), and many of its
Economic Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 104-28 (1966) (statement of Clifford M. MacMillan, Vice
President, Studebaker Corp.); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 53-57 (1990).
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 18, at 54-55.
ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE V (Dana J. Domone ed., 1 9 9 4 ) .
21
 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983). Paul Fassar, former Assistant Secretary
of Labor for Labor-Management Relations, once noted that the employees "at the Labor Depart-
ment, .. charged with administering a good portion of [ERISA] can indeed substantiate the
statement that ERISA is one of the most complex laws ever enacted by Congress." Paul Fassar,
The New Pension Law, 28 PRoc. N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 59 (1975).
22 See ERISA § 2, '29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). A House report on ERISA establishes that Congress
designed ERISA to:
(I) establish equitable standards of plan administration;
(2) mandate minimum standards of plan design with respect to the vesting of plan
benefits;
(3) require minimum standards of fiscal responsibility by requiring the amortization
of unfunded liabilities;
(4) insure the vested portion of unfunded liabilities against the risk of premature
plan termination; and
(5) promote a renewed expansion of private retirement plans and increase the
number of participants receiving private retirement benefits.
H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4640;
see also Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992) ("ER1SA's
central purpose [is] safeguarding benefit expectations.").
23
 ERISA §§ 2-608, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1168 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
24 ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. g§ 1021-1031 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
25 ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
26 ERISA §§ 301-308, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
27 ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
28 ERISA §§ 501-515, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
ERISA §§ 601-608, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
March 19951
	 PLANT CLOSINGS AND IERISA 	 205
provisions substantially parallel provisions of Title I." Generally, an
employer must comply with the requirements of Title II and the IRC
for its pension and welfare benefit costs to receive tax-favored treat-
ment."' Title 111 32
 designated agency authority at the time of ERISA's
enactment." Title IV governs the termination of pension plans, creates
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"), and outlines the
PBGC insurance program."
B. Welfare Benefit Plans Compared to Pension Plans
ERISA distinguishes between pension plans and welfare benefit
plans. Employers establish pension plans to provide employees with
income upon retirement or to otherwise permit the deferral of income
at least until the termination of employment." ERISA divides pension
plans into two types: defined contribution pension plans and defined
benefit pension plans. In a defined contribution pension plan, the
employer makes contributions to accounts established on behalf of
individual employees. 36
 The retirement benefits of each employee de-
pend entirely on the value of that employee's account. 37 Thus, the em-
ployee bears the investment risk because the value of the employee's
final benefit equals the sum of the contributions as adjusted for invest-
ment returns.
A defined benefit pension plan includes any other type of pension
plan.38
 Essentially, a defined benefit pension plan promises to pay a
dollar amount at retirement, based upon a formula specified in the
plan. Formula factors for salaried employees frequently include: age;
years of service; and final average salary over a specified period of
years. Hourly employees often receive a benefit determined primarily
" ERISA §§ 100I-2008, 88 Stat. 829, 898-994 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the I.R.C. (1988)).
31 See. Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income. Policies: Nondiscrimination, Integration,
and the Quest for Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REV. 433, 444-46 (1987).
32 ERISA §§ 3001-3043, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242 (1988 & Stipp. IV 1992).
"The original designation of agency authority was revised by Reorg. No. 4 of 1978, 3 C.F.R.
§ 332 (1978), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1163 (1982) and in 92 Stat. 3790 (1978).
34
 ERISA §§ 4001-4402, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1988 & Stipp. IV 1992).
ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1988).
56
 A comparatively small number of plans provide for after-tax employee contributions. Many
contributions frequently thought of as employee contributions, such as discretionary contribu-
tions to § 401(k) plans, are defined by ERISA as employer contributions. I.R.C. § 401 (k) (2) (A)
(1988),
"ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) (1988).
"ERISA § 3(35), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1988). For additional information regarding defined
benefit and defined contributions plans, see Peter T. Scott, A National Retirement Income Policy,
44 TAX Num 913, 919-20 (1989).
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by their years of employment. Some plans provide enhanced early
retirement benefits if the participant meets certain minimum age and
service requirements. 39 A number of plans provide enhanced benefits
only if the participant meets the age and service criteria and a perma-
nent layoff or plant closing occurs." In a defined benefit plan, the
employer bears the investment risk because the employer must make
sufficient contributions to the plan to pay the promised benefits re-
gardless of the return earned by plan investments." This Article fo-
cuses primarily on employers with defined benefit pension plans.
In contrast to pension plans, welfare benefit plans include pro-
grams such as: health insurance; life insurance; and vacation payment
plans." For example, the typical employer-provided health care plan
is an ERISA welfare benefit plan. In addition, certain severance pay
plans and cost-of-living retirement supplements may be treated as
welfare plans instead of pension plans. 43
Many of ERISA's fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure obligations
apply equally to pension plans and to welfare benefit plans." Overall
though, ERISA and the IRC currently regulate pension plans far more
heavily than they regulate welfare benefit plans, especially with respect
to levels of participation and funding." And, as the next section ex-
plains, the concepts of accrual and statutory vesting apply only to
pension plans.
C. Accrual Compared to Vesting
Accrual of benefits describes how an employee earns increased
pension benefits over time." The terms of a defined benefit pension
39 See, e.g., the "30 and out" and "85 point" benefits tinder the plan at issue in Nemeth v.
Clark Equipment Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 903 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
°See the discussion of USX's "Magic Number" benefits infra at note 81 and the discussion
of Continental Can's Rule of 70/75 benefits infra at note 114.
41 Risks to participants in a defined benefit plan are further mitigated by the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") insurance program, at least to the limited extent of PBGC
benefit guarantees, and so long as the PBGC remains solvent However, the PBGC's deficit was a
record $2.7 billion in 1992. Lack of PBGC Reform May Force Well-Funded Plans to Pay, Pickle Says,
20 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 583 (Mar. 15, 1993); see also R. IPPOIXFO, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION
INSURANCE (1989).
42 ERISA § 3(I), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).
43 ERISA § 3(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(B) (1988).
44 See, e.g., ERISA §§ 101-111, 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, 1101-1114 (1988 & Stipp.
IV 1992).
45 See, e.g., I.R.C.§§ 401(a), (k), 415 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (amended 1992) (applying only
to ERISA pension plans). This could change draMatically upon enactment of national health
care legislation.
46 I GARY BOREN, QUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS § 3:22 (Norman P. Stein &
Carolyn E. Smith eds., 1994).
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plan determine the amount of a participant's accrued benefit at any
point in time.° Every pension plan must contain an accrual method."
In contrast to accrual, statutory vesting is the method by which an
employee's accrued pension benefit becomes nonforfeitable. In plans
with "cliff' vesting, the entire accrued benefit becomes nonforfeitable
at a single point in time. Generally, ERISA requires this to occur by the
date the employee completes five years of service." Alternatively, plans
may provide for "incremental" vesting where, at minimum, benefits
vest at the rate of twenty percent per year, beginning when the em-
ployee completes three years of service. i° In any case, an employer must
vest all accrued benefits at the time of a complete or partial plan
termination. 51 However, if the employee's accrued benefit equals zero,
the vested and nonforfeitable benefit also equals zero.
The following somewhat simplified example helps clarify the dis-
tinction between benefits accrual and vesting. A typical defined benefit
plan might provide for five-year cliff vesting and offer an annual bene-
fit at normal retirement age of two percent per year of credited service
multiplied by the employee's average annual salary over the final five
years of employment. 52
 The employee will be fully vested in the plan
after five years. As a result, the employee has a right to receive his or
her accrued benefit at normal retirement age, even if his or her
employment terminates. However, with five years of credited service,
the employee's annual accrued benefit (the amount receivable at nor-
mal retirement age) would equal only ten percent (two percent per
year for five years) multiplied by the average annual salary over the
five years of employment.
An employee who continues to work for the same employer con-
tinues to accrue additional benefits both because the percentage will
increase as the years of credited service increase and because salary
typically will increase. The nature of these accruals, combined with the
effects of inflation, means that employees tend to accrue most of their
defined benefit pension plan benefits in the final years of their em-
47 See ERISA § 3(23), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
48
 ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
49
 ERISA § 203(a) (2) (A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2) (A) (1988). In comparison, multiemptoyer
plans are permitted to delay vesting for up to 10 years. ERISA § 203(a) (2)(C), 29 U.S.C.
§ I053(a) (2) (C) (1988).
ERISA § 203(0(2) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2) (11) (1988).
51 I.R.C. § 411(d)(3) (1988), as amended by Unemployment Compensation Amendments of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-318, § 521(b) (44), 106 Stat. 290, 311.
52 This is sometimes known as a unit benefit formula. The major alternative way of calculating
benefits is known as a flat benefit formula. See 1 BOREN, supra note 46, at § 3:23; LANGRE1N &
supra note 18, at 42.
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ployment.53
 And as employees grow close to retirement age, the accru-
als become even more costly to employers because of the reduced time
for investment growth. Economic research confirms this phenomena
by finding the existence of a spike in the rate of accruals at the point
an employee reaches normal retirement age. 54
Similarly, it is by continuing to work until they meet the plan's
minimum age and years of service criteria that employees typically
become eligible for enhanced benefits." Again, economic research
shows a significant spike in the rate of accruals at the point an em-
ployee becomes entitled to an enhanced benefit." Because the value
of accruals in defined benefit plans continues to be weighted toward
the end of an employee's career, denying an aging employee the
opportunity to earn accruals can significantly limit a plan's benefit
obligations and defeat employee expectations. Thus, protecting em-
ployees from actions meant to deprive them of the opportunity of
earning additional accruals or meeting the minimum criteria for en-
hanced benefits comports with ERISA's goal of enforcing benefit
promises but imposes significant costs on employers, especially as em-
ployees approach retirement age.
ERISA's statutory vesting requirements apply only to pension plans. 57
Because those plans promise future benefits, Congress perceived the
need for vesting to ensure that the benefits would be available to
employees at retirement. By comparison, welfare benefits typically are
funded, or insurance purchased, on a "pay as you go" basis. Therefore,
at the time of ERISA's enactment, there seemed little reason to require
statutory vesting of welfare benefits and they were exempted. 58
" See Ippolito, supra note 41, at 16-21; R. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY, 36-51 (1986); see also LANCBEIN Sc WOLK, supra note 18, at 114. Primarily because of
perceived abuses aimed at benefiting company insiders, the I.R.C. sets forth some rather complex
minimum accrual formulas; the example in the text is somewhat simplified because of the
intricacies of accrual requirements. Seel.R.G. § 411(b) (1988); 1 BOREN, supra note 46, at §§ 3:22,
3:27. Also, the exact definition of "accrued benefits" sometimes becomes important and contro-
versial when a pension plan is terminated. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Note, Changing the Rules of
the Game: Pension Plan Terminations and Early Retirement Plans, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1034,1038-51
(1989) (discussing whether early retirement benefits constituted accrued benefits prior to clari-
fying amendments in the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, § 301(a) (2), 98 Stat. 1451, codified at
29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1988)).
54 Alan L. Gustman et al., The Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A Survey of the Literature,
47 lsmus. & LAB. REL. REP. 417,426-27 (1994).
55
 ERISA does not require an accrued benefit to include the value of early retirement
subsidies. ERISA § 204(b) (1)(H) (v), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b) (1)(H) (v) (1988).
5ti
 Gttstman et al., supra note .54, at 426-27.
ERISA § 203(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
55
 Congress has begun to question the wisdom of this exemption as employers have reduced
health care coverage for their retirees. See, e.g., Bill to Preserve Retiree Benefits During Litigation
Introduced by Wofford, Pens. & Benef. Dly. (BNA) (July 21, 1993). Employer liabilities for unfunded
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D. Two Ends of the Spectrum
This section reviews two recent cases where former employees
alleged that their employers violated section 510 by considering em-
ployee benefit costs in making plant closing decisions."
In Unida v. Levi Strauss & Go., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
found no evidence that the employer based its plant closing decision
on employee benefit cost considerations. 6° Levi Strauss & Company
("Levi") closed its San Antonio plant after a decrease in demand for
its Dockers pants. 6 ' Former plant employees filed a class action alleg-
ing, among other claims, that Levi closed the plant to interfere with
the plaintiffs' benefits. 62 A magistrate recommended summary judg-
ment for Levi on all of the plaintiffs' claims and the federal district
court accepted that recommendation . 43
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that section 510 did not require
them to prove, as part of their prima facie case, that Levi had the
specific intent of interfering with their benefits. 64 The circuit court
disagreed. 65 Consistent with existing case law, the court held that the
"for the purpose of interfering"' language in section 510 requires
plaintiffs to prove the defendant acted with the specific intent to
interfere with benefits. 67
retiree health care are estimated at $412 billion, and a large number of employers report
considering action to reduce the costs of their retiree health programs. GENERAL. ACCOUNTING
OFFIcE, Puri, No. 93-125, RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS NOT SECURE (1993). Some employees have
prevailed in suits disputing welfare benefit reductions on a theory of contractual vesting, espe-
cially where plan documents do not reserve the employer's right to amend or terminate the plan.
See, e.g., In re White Farm Equip. Co., 788 F.2(1 1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1986); Steven J. Sacher &
Evan Millet; The Obligation to Provide Postretirement Welfare Benefits —The Evolving Case Law, 4
LAB. LAw, 735 (1988). The Third Circuit further limited employer's rights in Schoonejongen v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 18 F.3d 1034 (3d Cir. 1994) (employer prohibited from terminating retiree
health insurance benefits because the plan documents did not contain the amendment procedure
required by ERISA § 402(b) (3) even though the employer clearly had reserved the right to amend
or terminate the plan), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3844 (U.S. June 1, 1999) (No. 93-1935).
Again, national health care legislation could make dramatic changes to the law in this area.
59
 These two cases are analyzed in detail because they illustrate opposite findings of employer
intent and opposite outcomes. See infra Part 11.13. for a discussion of additional plant closing
cases.
60 986 F.2d 970, 981 (5th Cir. 1993).
61 Id. at 973.
621d.
63 Id
64 1d. at 979.
Unida, 986 F.2d at 979.
66 ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). See infra text accompanying note 92 for the relevant
portion of § 510.
67 Unida, 986 F.2d at 979-80.
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In the alternative, the plaintiffs argued that they had established
specific intent by providing evidence that Levi closed the San Antonio
plant: (1) to reduce costs; (2) at a time when Levi knew its corporate-
wide benefit costs were increasing rapidly; (3) instead of a Caribbean
plant where there were no benefit costs; and (4) with the result of
preventing 369 employees from becoming fully vested in their bene-
fits.68 The court of appeals found the first two reasons too general to
prove specific intent because the plaintiffs had not offered evidence
showing increasing benefit costs at the San Antonio plant. 69 The court
feared that permitting the claim to survive summary judgment based
on corporation-wide cost data would result in similar claims from every
plant closing."
With respect to the 369 unvested employees, the plaintiffs failed
to show that the closing of the San Antonio plant prevented more
employees from vesting than if Levi had closed another plant. 1 ' The
court noted that Levi maintained the Caribbean plant through the
federal 807 Program which is intended to foster investment by United
States companies in certain foreign countries. 72 In the court's view, to
admit participation in the 807 Program as evidence of specific intent
to interfere with ERISA benefit rights would undermine the 807 Pro-
gram. 7° Finally, the court decided that the plaintiffs had failed to
controvert the Levi manager who testified: "[M]y decision to close the
San Antonio plant was made without regard to costs associated with
pension, workers' compensation, or other employee benefits." 74
At the other end of the spectrum is Pickering v. USX Corp., where
the district court in Utah found USX Corporation ("USX") idled its
Geneva Works and Keigley Quarry facilities (collectively "Geneva")
with the specific intent of interfering with the benefit rights of "active"
and "management" employees in violation of section 510. 15 Evidence
" Id. at 980.
69 Id. at 980-81.
70 Id.
71
 Id. at 980.
72 Unida, 986 F.2d at 981.
75 id. at 980-81.
74 Id. at 980.
75 809 F. Supp. 1501, 1570 (I). Utah 1992). Other claims at issue under § 510 were: (1) USX
failed to recall laid-off employees in order to avoid benefit costs; (2) USX sold the plant in violation
of ERISA § 510; and (3) USX pressured employees to retire and inappropriately amended its
plans in order to reduce benefits. Id. at 1531. The plaintiffs won on the first allegation but lost
on the remaining two claims. Id. at 1540, 1545, 1550. The classifications of employees were
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showed that, as of late 1985, USX intended to utilize the output from
Geneva through late 1989 to supply a joint yen ture. 76 Thus, it appeared
likely that Geneva would remain open through 1989. 77
However, a work stoppage occurred at Geneva on August 1, 1986,
at which time USX idled the Geneva facilities. 78 The district court
found that USX failed to conduct any reasonable cost studies of the
Geneva operation between late 1985 and the idling of the Geneva
plant, other than studies of the pension costs at the plant. 79 In fact,
based on benefit studies done by USX, an expert for the plaintiffs
estimated that pension costs would increase by more than $50 million
if USX waited until 1989 to close the plant instead of closing the plant
in 1986." This was true even though many employees already had
vested benefits as of 1986, because by 1989 a significant number of
employees would become eligible for much more lucrative "Magic
Number" benefits.'
In addition to asserting a link between idling Geneva and an
overall restructuring intended to increase the efficiency of the steel
division, USX argued that section 510 did not apply to the idling for
two statutory reasons. First, in the view of USX, Congress did not
intend section 510 to "regulate 'every corporate business decision
which [has] any possible collateral effect on pension benefits . . . ."82
Second, USX believed that the plant closing could not be discrimina-
tory because USX treated all of the employees at Geneva equally in the
plant closing regardless of their entitlement to benefits."
The court dismissed as pretextual USX's stated efficiency basis for
the idling because USX offered employee benefit cost studies as the
only reasonable studies of the Geneva operations." The court also
78 1d. at 1546.
77 it-L
78 Id. at 1550. Basic Manufitcturing and Technology purchased Geneva on August 31, 1987.
Id. at 1542.
79 Id. at 1547.
89 Pickering, 809 F. Supp. at 1546.
"I Id. at 1546-49. Participants would become entitled to Magic Number benefits under the
USX plan when their plant closed or they were laid off and they had attained a minimum
combination of years of service and age prior to the closing or lay off. Id. at 1516. The case cited
the eiample of Tony Pickering who had a deferred vested pension of $15,800 as of July 31, 1986
but who, by 1989, would become eligible for a Magic Number benefit of approximately $217,000.
Id. at 1549 n.27,
82 Id. at 1548 (quoting Memorandum in Support of USX's Tenth Motion for Partial Summary
judgment (Counts 1, III, VI and VII) at 23 (quotation omitted)).
85 Pickering, 809 F. Supp. at 1548.
84 Id. at 1550-52. According to St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. CL 2742, 2759 (1993),
in the context of Title VII, it is not necessarily sufficient for a plaintiff to prove that the employer's
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dismissed USX's first statutory argument because the plaintiffs based
their claims on USX's motive in closing the plant and not just on the
collateral effect of the closing.85 Finally, the court rejected the second
statutory argument, finding irrelevant the number of employees ter-
minated by the employer's action "if such action is taken for the
determinative purpose to interfere with pension liability." 86
The court had bifurcated the trial, and thus deferred determina-
tion of the amount of damages to the second phase of the action. 87
Still, the court stated that damages would be individually calculated
and would depend on "USX's actual treatment of each Geneva em-
ployee."H8 Also, the court determined that the plaintiffs were entitled
to continued benefits as if USX had not illegally idled Geneva. 89
In sum, Levi illustrates that if an employer does not consider
employee benefit costs as a factor when deciding which of its plants to
close, that employer has not violated section 510. In contrast, the USX
decision indicates that an employer violates section 510 when it makes
a plant closing decision based exclusively on benefit costs. However,
the threshold question raised by USX is whether section 510 applies to
a plant closing decision.
II. APPLICATION TO PLANT CLOSING DECISIONS
Employers, such as USX, have argued that section 510 does not
apply to plant closing decisions. This Part examines that issue begin-
ning with the language and legislative history of section 510. This Part
then reviews the applicable case law and analyzes the relevant eco-
nomic, interpretative, and policy considerations. Finally, this Part con-
cludes that section 510 does apply to plant closing decisions.
A. Statutory Language and Legislative History
To clarify the argument, employers reason that in a plant closing
situation, where the decision to terminate employment affects all em-
ployees regardless of pension eligibility, the employers could not have
discriminated on the basis of pension eligibility and thus could not
proffered reasons were pretextual; the plaintiff always maintains the ultimate burden of proving
discrimination. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the allocation of burdens of production and
persuasion.
85 Pickering, 809 F. Supp. at 1548.
88 Id.
" Id. at 1513.
88 Id. at 1552.
as Id.
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have violated section 510. Employers also argue that section 510 does
not apply to large-scale decision making such as a plant closing. 9° An
evaluation of these arguments properly begins with the language of
the statute. 91 Section 510 states, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, sus-
pend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant
or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled
under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this title,
section 3001, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure
Act, or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of
any right to which such participant may become entitled un-
der the plan, this tide, or the Welfare and Pension Plans
Disclosure Act. 92
In parsing the words of the statute, one could focus on the refer-
ences to the potential plaintiff(s). And in each instance, as highlighted
above, the statutory references are in the singular. Arguably then, the
conduct prohibited by the statute is conduct targeted directly at a
single employee, or targeted on an employee-by-employee basis. Also,
the floor debates on section 510 focused on the effectiveness of section
510 in protecting employees from individually targeted actions." Thus,
there are some indications that section 510 does not apply to across-
the-board decisions such as plant closings.
Section 510's usage of the singular, however, is not dispositive in
construing the statute. The very first section of the United States Code
states that: "In determining the meaning of any act or resolution of
Congress, unless the context otherwise indicates, words importing the
singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things .." 94
Likewise, the nondiscrimination provision in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196495 ("Title VII") is written in the singular. Often, in
9° See, e.g., id. at 1548.
91 One commentator has observed that in recent employment and employee benefit deci-
sions, the Supreme Court has both begun and concluded its analysis with the language of the
applicable statute. Janice R. Bellace, The Supreme Court's 1992-93 Term: A Review of Labor and
Employment Law Cases, 9 LAB. LAW. 603, 605 (1993).
92 ER1SA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988) (emphasis added).
93 See infra Part III.B.2.c. for a thorough review of the legislative history of § 510.
9a1 U.S.C. § I (1982).
95 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1-17 (1988 & Stipp, IV 1992). Section 2000e-2(a) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for ass employer—( I) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any in-
dividual withrespect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
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enforcing section 510, the courts have looked to the case law under
Title VII for precedent." Title VII consistently has been interpreted as
precluding employer actions taken against groups of employees as well
as precluding individualized discriminatory acts. 97
In addition, one should look carefully at the actual actions pro-
hibited by section 510. It is true that the relevant provision of section
510 forbids discrimination. To violate section 510, however, an em-
ployer need not discriminate among employees at a single plant. An
employer also would discriminate against employees with respect to
their benefits by comparing benefit costs among plants and closing the
plant with the highest benefit costs to avoid those costs.
Furthermore, section 510 forbids not only discrimination, but also
a variety of specific actions, including, but not limited to, discrimina-
tion undertaken for the purpose of interfering with benefits. One of
the prohibited actions is "discharge." Thus, if an employer closes a
specific plant and discharges the employees in order to interfere with
benefit entitlements, the discharge of the affected employees consti-
tutes an act prohibited by section 510 even if no discrimination occurs.
In contrast, Title VII prohibits a variety of actions that constitute
discrimination but its protections do not go beyond discriminatory
actions." The courts should recognize this difference in the plain
meaning of the two statutes and should enforce the full range of
prohibitions contained in section 510.
Indications in the legislative history lend limited support to the
conclusion that section 510 applies to plant closings. Section 510 was
viewed as one of the "fourteen basic rights"" protected under ERISA;
the courts have, accordingly, construed its protections broadly." Also,
concern over plant closings helped spark Congress's interest in pen-
sion reform.'° 1
The language of the statute leads to the logical conclusion that
section 510 precludes an employment decision intended to affect groups
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
Id, § 2000e-2(a).
96 See infra Part IV for a discussion of allocation of burdens of proof.
97 Disparate treatment class actions and disparate impact cases are examples of such recog-
nized claims. SeeBARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 1230-34 (2D ED. 1983) & 170-71 (N. THOMPSON POWERS ED., 21.) ED. Stipp. 1987-1989).
98 See supra note 95 for the relevant language of Tide VII.
`99 120 CONC. ItEc. 29,935 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams). See infra text accompanying
notes 228-30 for a more detailed discussion of this portion of the legislative history.
160 Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984).
101 See supra text accompanying notes 1 8- 1 9.
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of employees. The legislative history, though not dispositive, supports
this conclusion. The next section considers the case law on this issue.
B. Case Law
To date, the case law generally has applied section 510 to plant
closing decisions.m2 In determining that section 510 applies to plant
closing decisions, the USX court" relied on Nemeth v. Clark Equipment
Co.'" In Nemeth, eighteen former employees who had worked at Clark's
Benton Harbor plant when the plant closed in 1983 sued Clark Equip-
ment Company ("Clark"). 1 °5 All of the plaintiffs were vested in their
basic pension benefits at the time of the closing; however, they claimed
Clark closed their plant in order to prevent them from attaining more
lucrative "30 and out" or "85 point" benefits. 1 °6
Clark first argued that section 510 applies to neither plant closings
nor other situations resulting from financial problems. The court dis-
missed this argument, stating that "the employer will violate ERISA if
it makes an employment decision solely, or even substantially, for the
purpose of avoiding pension liability." 107 Clark also argued that the
termination of employees at Benton Harbor was an across-the-board,
plant-wide decision. As such, Clark believed that section 510 could not
apply to its closing of the Benton Harbor plant because the termina-
tions did not depend on the individual pension entitlements of the
employees. The court rejected this argument, stating that "ERISA does
not distinguish between the termination of one employee and the
termination of 100 employees. Either action is illegal if taken with the
purpose of avoiding pension liability."L° 8 In the end though, Clark
102 See Deeming v. American Standard, Inc., 905 F.2d 1124, 1129 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying
employees the right to elect layoff when their plant closed violated § 510); Anderson v. Torrington
Co., 13 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1551, 1557-58 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (plaintiff's alleged the
employer selected their plant for closure because it had the highest benefit costs). The only
exception occurs in dicta in Moehle TA NL Industries, Inc., where the court sue sponte addressed
the application of § 510 without the benefit of briefs or arguments on the issue. 646 F. Supp. 769,
779 n.6 (ED. Mo. 1986), affd per curiatn, 845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988). The Moehlecourt decided
that § 510 does not apply to plant closing decisions because the section "only prohibits action
aimed at individuals so long as the plant closure had business justification." Id.
105 809 E Supp. at 1548.
154 677 F. Supp. 899 (WO, Mich. 1987).
1°5 Id. at 902.
106 Id. at 902-03. Under the standard plan, workers who began receiving benefits prior to
age 65 received benefits that were actuarially reduced. Id, at 903. Under either "30 and out" or
"85 point" retirements, the plaintiffs would have qualified both for benefits that were not
actuarially reduced and for health insurance. Id.
107 Id. at 905.
1 "8 Id. at 907.
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prevailed in the suit because employee benefits constituted only twenty
percent of the cost differential between the plants. 1 °9 Clark convinced
the court that it would have closed the Benton Harbor facility even if
it had not considered employee benefit costs."° The court considered
this an adequate defense.'"
Similarly, the Continental Can Company faced lawsuits when it
made employment and plant sourcing decisions based upon employee
benefit costs." 2
 In the late 1970s, Continental Can had developed
excess manufacturing capacity." 3 Continental Can also faced signifi-
cant plant closing benefit liabilities, especially for employees eligible
for Rule of 70/75 pensions.'" In order to minimize its plant closing
costs, Continental Can implemented a secret computer system known
as the "BELL" system. BELL was a reverse acronym for "Lowest Level
of Employee Benefits" or "Let's Limit Employee Benefits."" 5
In essence, the BELL system identified, by plant, the number of
employees already eligible for Rule of 70/75 benefits and fixed produc-
tion at each plant at a level that would result in continued employment
of those individuals."6 This permitted Continental Can to avoid the high
benefit costs associated with the termination of individuals eligible for
the enhanced benefits. 117 Similarly, the BELL system identified employ-
ees who were close to becoming eligible for Rule of 70/75 benefits."'
Continental Can permanently laid off those employees to prevent
them from obtaining eligibility for the costly enhanced benefits." 6
1 °9 Nemeth, 677 F. Supp. at 909.
"° Id.
Id; see also Deeming, 905 F.2d at 1127 (no violation of § 510 where employer closed plant
clue to increased competition and decreased demand, and not primarily to avoid benefit costs).
112 See, e.g., McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171,1173-74 (3d Cir. 1990), later
proceeding sub nom. McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N.J. 1992).
113
 See id. at 1175-76.
114 See id. at 1174. After being laid off for at least two years or after receiving a determination
that the lay off was permanent, a worker could receive a Rule of 70 pension if the worker had
accrued at least 15 years of service, was at least age 50 and the combination of age and years of
service added to at least 70. Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834,838-39 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 949 (1987), later proceeding sub nom. McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 802
F. Supp. 1216 (D.NJ. 1992). Eligibility requirements for the Rule of 75 pension were similar
except that there was no minimum age threshold but the combination of age and years of service
had to total at least 75. Id. at 839. Continental later agreed to a plan even more favorable to
laid-off employees, the "Rule of 65" plan. Id.
115
 McLendon, 908 F.2d at 1175 n.4.
116
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The resulting lawsuits included Gavalik v. Continental Can Co. ,I20
Jakub v. Continental Can Co., 12 ' and McLendon v. Continental Can Co.' 22
Gavalik and Jakub were later consolidated. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals determined in Gavalik that the BELL system, as utilized at
Continental's Pittsburgh plant, did violate section 510. 123 However, the
court allowed Continental Can to try to prove a "same loss" defense.' 24
Continental Can had the burden of proving "same loss."' 2" A district
court in New Jersey decided in McLendon that the decision in Gavalik
collaterally estopped Continental Can from retrying, for each plant,
the question of whether the BELL system violated section 510.' 2" The
district court then conducted a test trial on the "same loss" defense,
which Continental Can lost with respect to its largest plant.' 27 The
Third Circuit affirmed McLendon but determined that Continental
Can could retry the "same loss" defense for each plant. 128 An issue
remained as to whether Continental Can could obtain individual trials
on damages for each of the more than 5,000 plaintiffs.' 29 After approxi-
mately ten years of litigation costing millions of dollars, the Gavalik
and McLendon cases settled in 1992 for $415 million.'"
Some commentators have read the First Circuit's decision in Aron-
son v. Servus Rubber Division of Chromalloy"' to indicate that section
510 only applies to employment decisions aimed at individual partici-
pants and that it does not apply to decisions that affect a large number
of plan participants.' 32 This reasoning might exempt plant closings
from the scope of section 510. In Aronson, the employer partially
120 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987). For a more detailed discussion of the Gavalik and McLendon
cases, see GORDON L. CLARK, PENSIONS AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY,
48-100 (1993).
121 No. 82-1995 (W.D. Pa. 1992).
122 908 F.2d 1171 (3d Cir. 1990).
123 812 F.2d at 865.
124 Id. at 866.
128 /d. at 863.
126 McLendon, 749 F. Supp. 382, 384 (D.NJ. 1989).
127 Id. at 584.
128 McLendon, 908 F.2d at 1171, 1181.
129 See McLendon, 802 E Supp. 1216, 1220-21 (D.N.J. 1992).
191 Id. at 1217, 1221.
131 730 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1017 (1984).
132 See William C. Martucci & John L. Utz, Unlawful Interference with Protected Rights Under
ERISA, 2 LAB. Law. 251, 258-60 (1986); see also Joan Vogel, Containing Medical and Disability
Costs by Cutting Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ERISA Provide a Remedy?, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1024, 1060-61 (1987). Contra Terry Collingsworth, ERISA Section 510—A Further
Limitation on Arbitrary Discharges, 10 INDUS. RE'.. U. 319, 340 (1988) (stating that mass layoffs
violate § 510 if undertaken with the goal of avoiding pension expenses).
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terminated its pension plan after closing one of its divisions.'" The
affected employees alleged that the partial pension plan termination
discriminated against them in violation of section 510."4 The First
Circuit rejected this contention and decided that a partial plan termi-
nation, resulting from an independent criterion such as the closing of
a division for business reasons, does not result from invidious intent
or violate section 510.'"
Aronson can be distinguished from cases such as Clark Equipment,
Gavalik, and McLendon. The Aronson case focused on an employer's
decision to terminate all or part of an employee benefit plan with
respect to a group of former employees. Barring contractual obliga-
tions, employers have the right under ERISA to terminate benefit plans
due to financial or other business considerations, so long as they
reserved the right to terminate in the plans. In such cases, employers
exhibit no invidious intent, and the terminations comply with ERISA's
requirements.'" And, an employer always has the right under ERISA
to close a facility or terminate a group of employees for reasons not
associated with benefit costs. In contrast, when an employer terminates
an individual's or a group's employment in order to prevent the attain-
ment of benefit rights, the actions implicate both the language and
the intent of section 510.
C. Economic, Interpretative, and Policy Considerations
From an economic perspective, it may initially appear intolerable
that employers may not close plants during periods of fiscal hardship.
However, section 510 does not prohibit plant closings. Instead, by its
own terms, section 510 only forbids employers from closing plants "for
the purpose of interfering with the attainment" of benefit rights or in
retaliation for the exercise of benefit rights.u 7 In accordance with this
language, to establish a violation, plaintiffs must prove that their ern-
134 730 F.2d at 14.
134 See id. at 13.
Id. at 14-16.
136 /d. at 16; Seaman v. Arvida,Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 546 (11th Cir.) (distinguishing
termination of employment from modification or termination of an ER1SA welfare benefit plan),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 308 (1993); Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394, 398-99 (11th Cir.
1993) (modification of an ERISA welfare benefit plan); McGann v. 1 -1 & H Music Co., 946 F.2d
401, 405 (5th Cir. 1991) (similar analysis with respect to modification of an ERISA welfare benefit
plan), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992). See infra text accompanying notes 141-44 for a further
discussion of plan terminations.
137 ER1SA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988) (emphasis added).
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ployer acted with the specific intent to interfere with benefits or to
retaliate for the exercise of benefit rights. This requirement has served
as a significant limitation on lawsuits, and defendant employers have
been successful in obtaining summary judgment against such claims.' 38
Thus, the statute balances the need to protect the employment rela-
tionship from employer actions taken to deny employees their ex-
pected benefit entitlements with the need to preserve the right of
employers to operate in an efficient and profitable manner.
It would be incongruous to invalidate section 510's protections
whenever an employer experiences financial difficulty. Any other in-
terpretation would reward an employer that promised its employees
more expensive benefits than it could afford. The employer could fire
the employees at the very last moment to avoid paying the promised
benefits. Such a result would contradict the legislative history which
illustrates congressional concern about employers evading ER1SA's
protections by, for example, firing employees on the eve of becoming
vested in their benefits. 139 Nor is it rational to interpret section 510 as
protecting participants against individualized employer actions taken
to evade ERISA while permitting the same actions taken for the same
purpose when aimed at groups of participants.
As noted above,"° ERISA generally permits employers to termi-
nate benefit plans due to financial or other business considerations.
From an economic perspective, it may appear at first glance that plant
closings and other mass employment actions should not be treated
differently from plan terminations and that employers also should be
able to base plant closing decisions on benefit cost considerations
during a period of downsizing. However, a decision to terminate a plan
has different policy implications from a decision to close a plant in
order to avoid benefit costs.
The right to terminate plans is an important corollary of the fact
that the law does not require employers to sponsor private benefit plans.
As a result, ERISA explicitly permits plan terminations."' In plan amend-
ments and terminations, a number of mechanisms protect against
discrimination among employees. The IRC limits an employer's ability
m See, e.g., Unida v. Levi Strauss & Cu., 986 F.2d 970, 981 (5th Cir. 1993) (granting summary
judgment to the employer because the employees failed to prove a specific intent to interfere
with benefits and recognizing that every plant closing decision should not become the subject of
litigation).
13" See infra text accompanying notes 222-25.
140 See supra text following note 136.
141 See, e.g., ERISA § 4041, 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988 & Stipp. IV 1992).
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to allow some employees to participate in a pension plan while denying
other employees the right to participate.' 42 A partial termination or
plan amendment may possibly affect only some plan participants; how-
ever, ERISA and the IRC contain a number of provisions which ensure
that minimum numbers of employees benefit from a qualified benefit
plan and that the benefits of each plan participant are calculated fairly
in comparison to other plan participants.'" Finally, to protect plan
participants, ERISA sets forth detailed requirements for the actual
process of a plan termination.'"
On the other hand, the role played by the Studebaker plant
closing in bringing legislative attention to abuses in the pension system
and ERISA's legislative history indicate that section 510 is meant to
ensure that benefit entitlements do not disrupt the employment rela-
tionship. Case law also recognizes that section 510 protects "`the em-
ployment relationship against actions designed to interfere with, or dis-
criminate against, the attainment of a pension right. . . .'”145 A plant
closing clearly is one example of an employer action that affects the
employment relationship. The fact that a plant closing affects the
employment relationship of many employees instead of just a single
employee does not exempt the decision process from the reach of
section 510.
Furthermore, by closing a certain plant because of the high em-
ployee benefit costs at that plant, the employer essentially shifts the
cost of the plant closing from the employer to the employees. This is
especially true in cases like Gavalik v. Continental Can, Co. 14" and
McLendon v. Continental Can, Co.,' 41 where the employer makes sour-
cing or plant closing decisions to avoid paying costly plant closing
benefits.'" Continental Can's actions were particularly egregious be-
cause Continental Can agreed with the United Steel Workers of Amer-
142 See I.R.C. § 401(a) (1988 & Supp, IV 1992).
/ 43 1d
144 See, e.g ERISA §§ 4041-4048, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1348 (1988 & Stipp. IV 1992).
145 McGath v. Auto-Body North Shore, Inc., 7 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Deeming
v. American Standard, Inc., 905 F.2d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1990)(emphasis added). Providing
protection to the employment relationship does not preclude protection against discrimination.
See infra note 252 (noting the controversy over giving content to the discrimination provision of
§ 510).
146 Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987),
later proceeding sub nom. McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N.J. 1992).
147 McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171 (3d Cir. 1990), later proceeding sub nom.
McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N.J. 1992).
143 CLARK, supra note 99, at 95. USX utilized a similar strategy when it closed Geneva early
to prevent employees from becoming entitled to Magic Number benefits. Pickering v. USX Corp.,
809 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Utah 1992).
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ica to plant closing benefits that were more favorable to Continental
Can employees than past benefit plans. At the same time, Continental
Can utilized the BELL system to limit the numbers of employees that
could become entitled to plant closing benefits.' 49
From an interpretative standpoint, applying section 510 to large
scale employment decisions raises the concern of further "federalizing
the law of employee discharge."'" ERISA contains a pre-emption pro-
vision recognized as being "conspicuous for its breadth."' Based upon
that provision, the Supreme Court has decided that ERISA pre-empts
a state wrongful termination claim by an employee who alleges dis-
charge in order to prevent him or her from vesting in his or her
pension plan benefits.' 52 Thus, ERISA already federalizes the tradi-
tional state law doctrine of employment-at-will to some extent. Apply-
ing the protections of section 510 to groups of employees would extend
the scope of ERISA pre-emption. However, such pre-emption would
apply only in cases where an intent to interfere with benefits or to
retaliate for the exercise of benefits motivated an employer. The entire
body of state law associated with individual employee terminations has
not been federalized simply because a termination results in the loss
of an opportunity to earn additional benefits. Instead, courts correctly
have refused to apply section 510 where an employment discharge,
undertaken for a legitimate purpose, simply prevents the attainment
of benefits.'" Continuing this distinction and refusing to apply ERISA
pre-emption in such cases would leave untouched the bulk of state
common law with respect to wrongful termination.
Some employers turn to a policy analysis and argue that plant
closings actually increase the benefits of certain employees. This is true
to a limited extent where plans provide for special, enhanced benefits
in the instance of a plant closing. However, all employees do not qualify
for such enhanced benefits. In addition, as illustrated by Pickering v.
USX alp. ,154 employers may close plants earlier than they otherwise
would in order to prevent employees from becoming eligible for en-
hanced benefits. While it may seem that fully vested employees do not
suffer any harm with respect to their benefits in a plant closing, even
149 CLARK, 5'U/if/I note 120, at 86-87.
15° LANGBEIN & WOLK, SUPT/1 note 18, at 110-11.
151 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990); ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992).
152 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990). See infra text accompanying
notes 168-71, 341-45 for discussions of Ingersoll-Rand.
155 See infra text accompanying notes 264-73.
154 809 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Utah 1992).
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those employees typically would benefit from earning additional accru-
als (and correspondingly higher benefits) during subsequent years of
employment. 155
 Other employees may be unvested or may be within a
few years of becoming eligible for programs like USX's "Magic Num-
ber" benefits.
D. Conclusion—Section 510 Should Apply to Certain Plant Closing
Situations
This Part has examined whether section 510 applies to mass em-
ployment decisions such as plant closings. The language of the statute
and the legislative history indicate that courts should limit the prohi-
bitions of section 510 to individually targeted actions. On the other
hand, the language of the statute and the legislative history also indi-
cate that section 510 prohibits interference with benefits regardless of
whether the interference occurs through discrimination or by one of
the other means prohibited by the statute.
To date, the courts generally have applied section 510 protections
in plant closing cases. Economic, interpretative, and policy analysis
support the results in the case law. The specific intent requirement
appropriately limits the prohibition on interference with benefits and
ensures that every mass employment decision does not violate section
510 simply because participants lose the opportunity to earn additional
benefits. As a result, employers properly maintain the right to close
plants due to general financial considerations.
Unfortunately though, this is far from the end of the inquiry.
Considerable controversy in the courts surrounds the types of benefit
rights protected by section 510. To the extent section 510 does not
protect certain benefit rights, that section would not prohibit an em-
ployer from considering the costs associated with the benefits when
making a plant closing decision. However, to the extent section 510
protects a variety of benefit rights, such as the right to enhanced
benefits or the right to earn additional accruals, section 510 will pro-
hibit employers from closing plants in order to interfere with the
attainment of those benefit rights. Thus, the next Part examines the
types of benefit rights protected by section 510.
155 See infra part 111.13.2. for a discussion of the debate over whether § 510 protects a plan
participant's right to such additional accruals. In relatively rare circumstances, an employee may
have earned the maximum possible benefit under the applicable pension plan; such an employee
would suffer no pension plan injury in a plant closing situation.
March 1995]	 PLANT CLOSINGS AND ERISA	 223
1II. BENEFITS PROTECTED BY SECTION 510
Much of the case law under section 510 follows separate strands
based on the language of the statute. As noted above, section 510
protects a participant from being "discharge [d], fine [(I], suspend [ed] ,
expel [led], discipline [d], or discriminate [d] against" (1) "for exercis-
ing any rights" (the "Exercise Clause"), or (2) "for the purpose of
interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant
may become entitled" (the "Interference Clause")' 56 under a benefit
plan or under Title I of ERISA. This Part initially discusses the rights
protected by the Exercise Clause. It then turns to the contours of the
Interference Clause, paying special attention to the controversy sur-
rounding whether section 510 protects only the initial vesting of bene-
fits. The Part ends with a brief examination of the application of
section 510 to benefits granted under welfare benefit plans.
A. Exercise Clause
The Exercise Clause prohibits certain types of retaliation against
a participant who makes benefit claims or challenges benefit denials,'"
Also, an employer may not fire an employee in retaliation for a benefit
claim filed by other plan beneficiaries such as the employee's spouse. 158
The Exercise Clause protects an employee if his or her employer
constructively discharges him or her in retaliation for filing benefit
claims. 159
In order to state a valid retaliation claim under the Exercise
Clause, a claimant must prove the defendant had the specific intent to
"discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against" 160
the claimant for exercising ERISA rights.'"' In determining the exist-
ence of specific intent, the courts generally utilize the concepts devel-
156 ER1SA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988). See supra text accompanying note 94 for the
language of the relevant portion of § 510. Section 510 also prohibits actions taken against anyone
for testifying or giving information in ERISA proceedings, ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
157 See Bitmer v. Sadoff Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 825 (7th Cir. 1984). See infra text
accompanying note 166 for a discussion of Bittner.
E 50 Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589 (1st. Cir. 1989) (employee's suit is cognizable
under § 510 if he was fired in retaliation for benefit claims filed by his former wile).
1 " Crouch v. Mo-Kan 'Iron Workers Welfare Fund, 740 E2c1 805, 810 (10th Cir. 1984) (union
secretary stated a claim under § 510 even though she quit because union officials made her
working conditions unbearable).
1 'ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
161 See, e.g., Owens v. Storehouse, Inc,, 984 F.2d 394, 398 (1 1 th Cir. 1993) (employer did not
violate the Exercise Clause by instituting a $25,000 cap on AIDS-related health care claims unless
employer instituted the cap to retaliate for previous claims).
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oped under Title VII for shifting burdens of production and persua-
sion.' 62 The Exercise Clause does not protect an employee who is
disproportionately affected by an employer's action if that action at
least nominally extends to all employees. 163
For the Exercise Clause to apply, the benefits at issue must be
protected by ERISA or provided under the employer's benefit plan.
For example, one employer suggested that its employee file a "friendly
lawsuit" to determine the legality of the employer's termination of
specific medical benefits utilized by the employee's son. 164 The em-
ployer then fired the employee for joining a state law claim seeking
compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress with his claim for benefits.' 65 The Exercise Clause did
not protect the employee from discharge because the discharge was
based upon the state law claims, not the ERISA claims. 166
B. Interference Clause
I. General Application
Upon reading the prohibition against interference with a partici-
pant's attainment of any right under a benefits plan or under Title I
of ERISA, 167 it may appear that the Interference Clause operates as a
ban on any interference with the attainment of any benefit right. In a
few situations the import of the clause appears to be just that clear. For
example, the Supreme Court recognized in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClen-
don, that a prototypical section 510 violation occurs when an employer
terminates an employee shortly before the employee's pension benefits
vest. 168 Ingersoll-Rand had fired McClendon after nine years and eight
months of employment. 169 As permitted by the vesting rules in effect
at the time, the Ingersoll-Rand plan contained a ten-year cliff vesting
provision.'" McClendon sued under Texas state common law alleging
that Ingersoll-Rand terminated him to avoid pension costs.' 7'
162 See infra part 1V.
1 " McGann v. H 8c 1-1 Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403-05 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
482 (1992). For a discussion of McCann, see infra text accompanying notes 280-84.
161 Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 825 (7th Cir. 1984).
160 Id,
166 Id, at 826.
167 For an explanation of the contents of Title 1 of ERISA, see supra text accompanying notes
23-29.
169 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990).
169 Id. at 135.
170 hl.
171
 Id. at 135-36. Actually, because of IRS regulations that apply to terminated employees,
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In a similar case, an employee successfully stated a claim under
the Interference Clause in Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co.' 72 when he was
fired a few weeks before his pension benefit vested. And many courts
agree that section 510 protects participants who are vested in basic
benefits but who have not yet become eligible for enhanced benefits
offered under their pension plan.'" At the opposite end of the spec-
trum, a plaintiff cannot state a cause of action under the Interference
Clause where the plaintiff has attained the maximum level of benefits
offered under the employer's plan.' 74
2. The Disagreement Over Protection for Vested Participants
While courts agree on the general parameters of the types of
benefits protected by the Interference Clause, they have not consis-
tently applied the Interference Clause to protect vested participants in
the accrual of additional benefits. As discussed in Part I.C., interfer-
ence with future accruals can significantly affect an employee's bene-
fits, especially in a defined benefit pension plan.'" This subsection
addresses the disagreement over the extent of protection provided by
section 510, beginning with the disagreement in the courts. Addressed
next is the language of the statute, the legislative history, and an
important early case, West v. Butler,"" that has been misconstrued. The
subsection concludes that section 510 does protect vested participants
and ends with a review of the implications for employers and vested
participants.
McClendon's pension benefits had vested and the issue before the Supreme Court simply was
ERISA's pre-emption of state common law wrongful termination claims. ld. at 135.
172 953 F.2d 1405, 1416 (1st Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993)
(vacating ADEA counts); see also Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 964 F.2d 1471, 1473, 1479 (5th Cir.
1992) (employee fired a few months prior to vesting under a ten-year cliff vesting provision), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1253 (1993); Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 672 (3d Cir. 1983)
(employee terminated after twenty-nine and one-half years, would have qualified for a disability
pension in another six months); McKay v. Capital Cities Communications, inc., 605 F. Supp. 1489,
1490-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (employee fired after nine years of service where employer's plan had
a ten-year cliff vesting provision).
175 See, e.g., Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1110-1 l (2d Cir. 1988) (assum-
ing that § 510 protected the plaintiffs right to his employer's enhanced "75/80" benefit plan
even though he was vested fully in the basic pension plan); cf. Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315, 1318-19 (C.D. Cal. 1984). Some read Baker as indicating that § 510
does not protect a vested participant's right to an early retirement benefit.. However, Baker really
just requires a plaintiff to make a strong showing of specific intent in order to avoid summary
judgment. See infra text at notes 264-73.
174 See Garry v. TRW, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 157, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (discussing Houck v. Lee
Wilson Eng'g Co., No. C82-351 (N.1). Ohio ,July 23, 1984)).
175 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
176 621 F.2d 240 (fith Cir. 1980).
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a. Disagreement in the Courts
In Donohue v. Custom Management Corp.,'" the employer eliminated
the plaintiffs' jobs and fired them after the subsidiary they managed
incurred substantial financial losses. The plaintiffs were vested in the
employer's retirement plan but claimed interference with their right
to earn additional accruals. 178
 For authority, the court looked to the
statement in West v. Butler.'" that section MO was "'aimed primarily
at preventing unscrupulous employers from discharging or harassing
their employees in order to keep them from obtaining vested pension
rights.'" Focusing on the phrase "vested pension rights" and appar-
ently ignoring both the importance of the "discharging or harassing"
phrase and the term "primarily," the Donohue court decided that,
because the plaintiffs were fully vested, their claims were beyond the
scope of coverage of the Interference Clause."'
Another district court case denying a vested plaintiff the opportu-
nity to state a claim of interference with benefits is Malone v. Gilman
Paper Co. 182
 In Malone, the plaintiff alleged that his employer coerced
him into retiring early at age 56 to prevent him from becoming entitled
to larger benefits at age 62. 183 The Malone court based its decision on two
factors. First, the court looked to a case that quoted the same language
from West utilized by the Donohue court and discussed above.' 84 Second,
the Malone court recognized that nearly every termination of employ-
ment results in the loss of an opportunity to accrue additional benefits.
Thus, the court decided the plaintiff had no cause of action under
section 510 because he was fully vested in his pension plan.' 85
177
 634 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
"8 Id. at 1190.
178 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980). For discussion of West, see infra part IILB.2.d.
188 Donohue, 634 K Supp. at 1197 (quoting West, 621 F.2d at 245) (emphasis added).
181 Id. The Donohue court also based its decision on the plaintiffs' failure to present evidence
that the employer's specific intent in carrying out the terminations was to interfere with benefits.
Id. See infra text accompanying notes '264-73 for a discussion of the specific intent requirement.
182
 737 F. Supp. 88 (S.D. Ga. 1990); see also Sangeniti v. Mutual of Am., No. 90-3558, 1990
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16809 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1990); Kelly v, Chase Manhattan Bank, 717 F. Stipp.
227, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Johnson v. United Airlines, Inc., 680 F. Stipp. 1425, 1432-33 (D. Haw.
1987); Moehle v. NL Indus., Inc., 646 K Supp. 769, 779 n.6 (E.D. Mo. 1986), affd without opinion,
845 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1988); Weir v. Litton Bionctics, Inc., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1150,
1153 (D. Md. 1986) (it appears that Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 K2d 231, 236
(4th Cir. 1991), implicitly overruled the holding in Weir), later opinion, 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 663 (D. Md. 1987); Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315, 1319
(N.D. Cal. 1984).
188
 Malone, 737 F. Stipp. at 89.
184 Id. at 88; see supra text accompanying note 180.
185
 737 F. Supp. at 90.
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In Van Zant v. Todd Shipyards Corp., a district court in Texas
recently stated an extremely narrow view of the scope of section 510's
protections.' 86 Todd Shipyards ("Todd") amended its retirement plan
to offer an early retirement program ("ERP") to employees at its Seattle
she in an attempt to decrease overstaffing in Seattle.' 87 The plaintiffs
were long-time employees at Todd's Galveston facility whom Todd had
retained to perform caretaker functions from the time of the Galveston
closing until Todd could sell the facility.' 88 The plaintiffs alleged that
Todd's failure to permit them to participate in the ERP constituted
discrimination in violation of section 510. 189 The court held that section
510 does not preclude employers from amending plans even if the
amendments have a disproportionate effect on one or more employ-
ees.v" Second, the court determined that the plaintiffs had failed to
put forth evidence that Todd's actions infringed on a right protected
by section 510.' 91 This conclusion is correct because the plaintiffs al-
leged a right to a benefit that had never been part of their pension plan.
However, the Van Zant court's language sweeps far more broadly
than necessary to decide this case. Specifically, the court stated that
"RI he right referred to in the second clause of section 510 is not simply
any right to which an employee may conceivably become entitled, but
rather any right to which an employee may become entitled pursuant
to an existing, enforceable obligation assumed by the employer. "192 Be-
cause, as recognized by the court, ERISA permits employers to prospec-
tively modify or terminate their benefit plans, few promised benefits
are enforceable prior to the point the benefits vest.'" As a result, taken
literally, the court's statement would eviscerate the protections of sec-
tion 510.
On the other hand, in the context of a plant closing, the court in
Nemeth V. Clark Equipment C0. 194
 narrowly read the Sixth Circuit prece-
dent in West v. Butler and decided, based on case law, legislative history,
and policy considerations, that vested employees are entitled to pro-
186 See 847 F. Stipp. 69, 73 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
' 87 1d. at 71.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 71-72.
19° See id. at 73.
191 Van Zuni, 897 F. Supp. at 73.
1921d. (emphasis added).
1118 Although ERISA contains an "anti-cutback rule" prohibiting plan amendments that re-
duce accrued benefits, an employer can seek a waiver of even this requirement. ERISA § 204(g),
29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1988).
194 677 F. Stipp. 899, 907-08 (W.D. Mich. 1987). See supra text accompanying notes 104-11
for a discussion of Clark Equipment.
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tection under section 510. Like the Clark Equipment court, numerous
courts have extended section 510 protection to the opportunity to
qualify for enhanced early retirement benefits. 1" In addition, many of
the recent appellate cases have extended the protections of the Inter-
ference Clause to the right of participants to earn future accruals
regardless of the availability of an enhanced early retirement benefit.
Conkwright v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., for example, involved an
employee, Conkwright, laid off at age 60.m He was fully vested in his
pension benefits, having worked for Westinghouse for almost 20 years.' 97
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals looked to the legislative history
and decided that Congress's intent to provide "broad remedies" for
interference with pension rights militated for the application of the
Interference Clause in the case at hand.'" However, the Fourth Circuit
ultimately granted summary judgment to Westinghouse because Conk-
wright failed to prove Westinghouse had the specific intent to interfere
with his pension benefits.'"
Similarly, in Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., all five plaintiffs had been
terminated as part of a reduction in force. 20° Four of the plaintiffs were
vested in their pension benefits, while the fifth was nine months away
from vesting at the time of his termination. 20' The Eleventh Circuit
followed the reasoning in Conkwright and determined that "Congress
did not intend to leave employees unprotected once their rights were
vested, . . ."2°2 Thus, the court decided that the protections of section
510 extended to the vested plaintiffs as well as to the unvested plaintiff.
However, this court, too, ultimately granted summary judgment to the
employer because the former employees failed to show that the em-
ployer had the specific intent to interfere with ERISA rights. 203
198 See, e.g., Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1115 (2d Cir. 1988); Pickering
v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1501, 1549-50 ( D. Utah 1992).
196 933 F.2d 231, 233 (4th Cir, 1991),
197 Id.
198
 Id. at 237.
199
 Id. at 236-39.
21 990 F.2d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 1993) (this decision appears to implicitly overrule the
holding in Malone y. Gilman Paper Co., 737 F. Supp. 88 (S,D. Ga. 1990)); see also Carry v. TRW,
Inc., 603 F. Supp. 157, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Citro v. TRW, Inc., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
391, 394 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Calhoun v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 357, 359-60 (E.D.
Mo. 1979); Marcoz v. Summa Corp., 801 l'.2d 1346, 1352-53 (Nev. 1990). While reserving
judgment on the issue, in Clark v. Resistoflex Co. Div. of Unidynamics, Corp., 854 F.2d 762, 770
(5th Cir. 1988), the Fifth Circuit said it perceived "room for a construction [of ERISA § 510) that
extends section 510 protection to vested employees as well [as to unvested employees]."
2U1 Clark, 990 F.2d at 1220-21.
292
 Id. at 1222.
214 Id. at 1226.
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b. The Statutory Language
The language of the Interference Clause is broad enough to
protect vested participants in the accrual of additional benefits because
it prohibits interference "with the attainment of any right to which such
participant may become entitled under the plan, [or under Title I of
ERISA] . . . ."2°4 Taken literally, the term "any right" would include a
participant's benefits based on additional accruals as well as a partici-
pant's right to become vested. In addition, it seems likely that Congress
would have replaced the foregoing phrase with the simple language
"with the attainment of a vested right under the plan, . . ." if Congress
had intended such a limitation. 2°'
On the other hand, those who believe section 510 protects only
unvested employees point to the phrase "may become entitled." It is
primarily through vesting that benefits become nonforfeitable. As a
result, once a participant is vested, that participant does become "en-
titled" to whatever benefits the participant has accrued. Arguably, the
use of the word "may" excludes post-vesting accruals from coverage
because, once vested, a participant is entitled to accruals as they occur.
Thus, the argument is that the language of section 510 protects the
right to become vested, but nothing more.
However, such a narrow reading of the phrase "may become enti-
tled" conflicts with the theory of accruals, with the other protections
ERISA accords to accruals, and with the language of the statute. As
noted above in Part I.C., it is largely through accruals that pension
benefits increase in value. As accruals increase, the benefit to which a
participant ultimately is "entitled" also increases. So, it is logical to
extend the concept of entitlement to the right to accrue additional
benefits. Furthermore, while ERISA Section 203 2°s extensively regulates
vesting, ERISA Section 204207 sets forth comprehensive rules regarding
accruals including intricate allocation formulas and a prohibition on
reducing benefits once the benefits have accrued. Given the significant
level of protection accorded accruals elsewhere in ERISA, it would be
inconsistent to construe the word "entitled" in section 510 as assuring
the right to vesting but not to accruals. Finally, vesting is not the only
method by which participants become entitled to benefits. Many plans
provide for early retirement benefits or supplements. Typically, partici-
pants become entitled to those enhanced benefits by meeting the
204 ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C., § 1140 (1988) (emphasis added).
205 See Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 237 (4th Cir. 1991).
206 ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2007 ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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plan's age and service criteria. 208 Although the enhanced benefits are
not vested, the participant is entitled to the benefits under the terms
of the plan. Section 510's language prohibiting actions taken "for the
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such
participant may become entitled under the plan, . . . "mg appears directly
to protect such participants even though the participants are vested in
their basic benefits.
In addition, section 510 casts a broad umbrella of protection by
protecting a plan "participant" from interference. ERISA defines the
term "participant" as including "any employee or former employee . . .
who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an
employee benefit plan . . . . "210 Employees who are vested are entitled
to receive a benefit. Therefore, they are participants, are covered by
the language of section 510, and should be protected from interference
in attaining additional accruals under their employers' benefit plans.
The word "plan" also indicates that accruals should receive pro-
tection. The use of the term "plan" in the Interference Clause most
likely refers back to the use of the term "employee benefit plan" in the
Exercise Clause. ERISA defines the term "employee benefit plan" as
including both welfare benefit plans and pension benefit plans. 2" Thus,
the language implies protection against interference with becoming
entitled to rights under either a welfare benefit plan or a pension
benefit plan. As discussed in Part I.C., statutory vesting only applies to
pension benefits. 212 Therefore, one commentator has argued that sec-
tion 510's protections must extend beyond the right to become vested
in order to reach beyond pension plans. 21 s However, an interpretation
limiting section 510 protections to vesting would accord relief to par-
ticipants whose welfare benefits vest other than through statutory vest-
ing.2 " Still, the statutory language does not contain any indication that
its scope is limited to vesting. Instead its reference to "any right" in
conjunction with its use of the term "employee benefit plan" implies
coverage for a wide variety of plan entitlements.
This examination of the language of section 510 indicates that
participants are entitled to protection from interference with their
right to earn additional benefit accruals as well as to protection in
becoming vested in their benefits. However, the crux of the disagree-
21)8 See, e.g., supra note 81.
2°11 ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988) (emphasis added).
210 ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1988) (emphasis added).
211 ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1988).
212 See supra text accompanying note 57.
213
 See Collingsworth, supra note 108, at 328-29.
214 See supra note 58.
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ment among the courts is the purpose of section 510 as found in the
legislative history. The next section reviews the legislative history of
section 510. Following that section is a discussion of West v. Butler, 2 ' 5
an important early case interpreting the legislative history.
c. Legislative History
Section 510 has not been amended since it was enacted as part of
the original version of ERISA in 1974. 216 Furthermore, Congress did
not change the Interference Clause significantly during the legislative
process.211 The earliest discussion of section 510, from April, 1973,
indicates that Congress's initial goal was to preclude employers from
interfering with "pension rights or the expectations of those righ te218
through the use of economic weapons. The legislative history provides
no indication that the legislature's concern extended only to vesting
of benefits. In fact, the report states that "safeguards are required .. .
in order to completely secure the rights and expectations brought into
being by this landmark reform legislation . . . ." 216 The focus on com-
plete protection indicates an intent that the Interference Clause help
guarantee the general effectiveness of ERISA. Certainly accruals were
among the rights protected by ERISA. Coverage by section 510 protects
employees' specific rights to accruals as well as their general benefit
expectations.
The same Senate report states: "The enforcement provisions have
been designed specifically to provide . . . broad remedies for redress-
ing or preventing violations of [ERISA] . . . ." 220 This statement adds
weight to the argument that the Interference Clause provides broad
protections. In fact, the Conkwright court cited this language as indi-
cating that Congress did not intend to limit the protections of the
Interference Clause to vesting of benefits.221
Floor discussions also addressed section 510. Twice, Senator Hartke
raised concerns about employment terminations meant to prevent the
215 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980).
216 Compare ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 510, 88 Stat. 829, 895 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1140 (Stipp. IV 1974)) (the section as enacted) with ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988) (the
current version). Congress has considered a number of proposed amendments. See, e.g., FI.R.
975, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993) (limiting decreases in health insurance coverage).
217 Section 510 was originally numbered as ERISA § 610. Compare ERISA § 610 as set forth
in S, REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess, 48 (1973) (the proposed version) reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N, 4838 with ERISA, Pub, L. No. 93--406, § 510, 88 Stat, 829, 895 (1974) (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 1140 (Stipp. IV 1974)) (the section as enacted).
2185 REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4872.
215 Id, (emphasis added).
220 id. at 4871.
221 Conkwright V. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, '236-37 (4th Cir. 1991).
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vesting of employees' pension benefits. First, he referred to the ERISA
provision permitting an employer to preclude an employee from pen-
sion plan eligibility and vesting prior to age thirty. 222 Senator Hartke
asked whether that limitation provided an employer with an incentive
to fire each of its employees on the day before the employee's thirtieth
birthday.223 Senator javits replied that section 510 was meant to provide
a remedy in "precisely the areas" of concern to Senator Hartke.224 The
next day, Senator Hartke proposed the creation of administrative ma-
chinery to aid in the enforcement of section 510 and raised another
vesting example. 225
In contrast to the narrow context of the floor discussions, the 1974
conference report noted that both the House and Senate versions of
section 510 provided: "[lit is unlawful to interfere with the attainment
of any rights to which a participant or beneficiary may become entided
. . . . 226 This reference to "any rights" parallels the statutory language
and appears to contemplate protection of more benefits than just the
unvested pension benefits referred to by Senator Hartke in the scenar-
ios mentioned above. The Conkwright court cited this reference to "any
rights" in support of its conclusion that the Interference Clause pro-
tects the rights of participants to additional accruals. 227
The final piece of legislative history that directly addresses section
510 contains remarks by Senator Williams, a co-sponsor of ERISA,
when he introduced the conference report to the Senate. In discussing
the administration and enforcement of ERISA, Senator Williams stated:
"A further protection for employees is the prohibition against dis-
charge, or other discriminatory conduct toward participants and bene-
ficiaries which is designed to interfere with attainment of vested ben-
efits or other rights under the bill . . . ." 228 The inclusion of "other rights"
in addition to the reference to "vested benefits" must mean that the
protections of the Interference Clause extend beyond the vesting of
222 The limitation enacted was age 25 and is now age 21. Compare ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
§§ 202(a) (I) (A) (i), 1011, 410(a) (1) (A) (i), 88 Stat. 826, 853, 898 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § I052(a) (1) (A) (i) (Supp. IV 1974) and I.R.C. § 410 (a)(1) (A) (i) (Supp. IV 1974), respec-
tively) (original age limitation of 25) with ERISA § 202(a) (1) (A) (i), 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1) (A) (i)
(1988) and I.R.C. § 410(a) (1) (A) (1) (1988) (current age limitation of 21).
223 For an explanation of the costs associated with vested benefits, see IPPOLITO, supra note
41, at 36-42.
224 119 CONG. Rec. 30,043-44 (1973).
225 la at 30,374.
226 1-1.k. CONF. Rat'. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 330 (1974) (emphasis added), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5110.
227 Conkwright, 933 F.2d at 236.
228 120 Cow, Rac. 529,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams) (emphasis added).
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benefits. As discussed above, 22" ERISA requires every plan to provide
for accruals of benefits and comprehensively regulates accruals. Thus,
it is reasonable to include the right to continued benefits accruals
among the "other rights under the bill" protected from interference.
Senator Williams went on to discuss "fourteen basic rights" which
lay "at the heart of pension reform and provide much-needed and
long-denied protections." 2s0 Vesting was one of the fourteen rights in
this "Pension Bill of Rights," but others included fair eligibility stand-
ards for plan participation and standards to ensure that plans used
reasonable criteria to calculate credit for time worked. 2S 1 Both concepts
are important in determining benefit accruals. The final basic right,
"Protection of Pension Rights Against Employer or Union Interfer-
ence," stated, in pertinent part:
Every employee is to have the right, enforceable by the
Secretary of Labor, to be free from interference with his
pension benefits. This means that he cannot be discharged,
fined, suspended, expelled or otherwise interfered with in
order to prevent him from receiving pension benefits or
attaining eligibility for pension benefits.2'2
This language reflects the essence of the protections of section
510. The use of the term "eligibility" and the repeated reference to
pension rights is subject to interpretation. Because an unvested partici-
pant is not eligible to receive retirement benefits, the statement might
support the argument that section 510's protections extend only to the
vesting of benefits. However, this reading is probably too narrow be-
cause the very first of the fourteen basic rights is entitled "Eligibility"
and protects the rights of employees to join pension plans at the later
of the time they reach age twenty-five or complete one year of service.
Therefore, the term eligibility must cover more than just the right to
initial vesting. And because earning additional accruals increases the
pension benefits to which a participant is entitled, it is logical to
interpret the phrase as extending to accruals. Also, while the legisla-
ture focused on pensions in 1974, that was generally true throughout
ERISA and should not be determinative as to the interpretation of the
breadth of section 510.
2299
	 sepia text accompanying note 48.
23°120 CONC. REG. 529,935 (1979) (statement of Sen. Williams).
231 Id.
252 M
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To summarize the legislative history, the floor debates of ERISA
contain indications of Congress's concern with protecting participants
from interference with benefit vesting. However, the relevant language
in the committee and conference reports, as well as a presentation
made by a co-sponsor of ERISA near the end of the legislative process,
indicate Congress intended the Interference Clause to protect more
than just the right to benefit vesting. The next section looks in detail
at an early case relying upon parts of the legislative history.
d. Interpretation of West v. Butler
The courts in Donohue2" and Matone234 both cited West v. Butte"
as authority for their conclusion that the Interference Clause protects
a participant's right to vesting, but not accrual, of benefits. In Clark
Equipment,2" however, a district court in the same circuit as West con-
cluded that West was not inconsistent with an interpretation of section
510 that extends protections to accruals. To reach its decision that
section 510 protects a participant's right to future accruals, the court
in Conkturight237 distinguished language in West. Therefore, this section
reviews the West decision in some detail.
In West, the defendants picketed a number of coal mines that had
collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") with the Southern Labor
Union ("SLU"), causing some mines to cut production. 238 The CBAs
required employers to contribute to pension and welfare funds ("SLU
Funds") created under the Taft-Hartley Act. 239 The CBA tied the level
of required contributions directly to the tons of coal produced. There-
fore, the production cutbacks caused a drop in employer contributions
to the SLU Funds.'"
233 Donohue v. Custom Management Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1190, 1197 (W.D. Pa. 1986); see
supra text accompanying notes 177-81.
254 Malone v Gilman Paper Co., 737 F. Supp. 88, 90 (S.D. Ca. 1990) (citing Curum v. Farm
Credit Servs., 628 F. Stipp. 707, 717 (1). Minn. 1986), which quoted WO; see supra text accom-
panying notes 182-85.
233 621 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1980).
236 Neineth v. Clark Equipment Co., 677 F. Stipp. 899, 908 (W.D. Mich. 1987); see supra text
accompanying note 194.
257 Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 237 (4th Cir. 1991); see supra text
accompanying notes 196-99.
258 621 F.2d at 241-42.
239 M. at 241; 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-200 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). These plans are also subject to
special regulation under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 which is
contained in Tide IV of ERISA.
Zoo West, 621 F.2d at 242.
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Trustees of the SLU Funds sued the picketers claiming their ac-
tions violated ERISA section 511 ("section 511 ") 241 "by engaging in
violent secondary picketing for the purpose of interfering with SLU
miners' ERISA-protected rights."242 Section 511, a companion provision
to section 510, prohibits coercive interference with, or coercive pre-
vention of the exercise of, any right of a participant under a benefit
plan or ERISA. 243 Section 511 provides for criminal penalties whereas
section 510 addresses less egregious methods of interference such as
employment discharge and relies upon ERISA's standard civil enforce-
ment sections. 244 The court determined the trustees had no private
right of action under section 511 and decided the case as though the
claim were based upon section 510. 2"
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by looking
to the earliest legislative history on the provision and concluded that
"Congress had a specific type of problem in mind when it enacted
sections 510 and 511 . . ."2"The court cited the floor debate, in which
Senator Hartke expressed his concern that employers would discharge
employees on the eve of vesting in order to minimize benefit costs. 247
The only other piece of legislative history cited was Senator Javits's
reliance on section 510's protections to allay Senator Hartke's con-
cerns."' To the court, this "legislative history reveal[ed] that the pro-
hibitions were aimed primarily at preventing unscrupulous employers
from discharging or harassing their employees in order to keep them
from obtaining vested pension rights." 249 The Donohue and Malone courts
relied upon this statement to conclude that section 510 protects only
vesting.
The West court relied on the same legislative history to support its
statement that "Congress designed § 510 primarily to protect the employ-
ment relationship that gives rise to an individual's pension rights."25"
The court proceeded to ignore its use of the word "primarily" and
decided that the trustees had failed to state a cause of action under
241 ERISA § 511, 29 U.S.C. § 1191 (1988).
242 West, 621 F.2d at 242-43 (footnote omitted).




621 F.2d at 243-49.
246 Id. at 245.
247
248 See id.
249 Id. (emphasis added).
250 621 F.2d at 295. (emphasis added, ibotnote omitted). This statement also supports the
extension of § 510 protections to accruals because accruals are critical in determining pension
entitlements.
236	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 36:203
this standard because the secondary pickets could not interfere di-
rectly with the employment relationslaip. 25 '
Therefore, the critical factor to the court was the extent to which
the alleged action interfered with the employment relationship. 252 Read
in this light, the court's reference to vested pension benefits can be
harmonized with the holding by focusing on the portion of the sen-
tence referring to "discharging or harassing" employees. The outcome
indicates that the West court focused on the specific problem of dis-
charging or harassing employees to avoid benefit costs. While the West
court did refer to benefit vesting, arguably it did so because that
provides the prototypical example of benefits interference. Certainly,
Senators Hartke and Javits used vesting as an example of a situation
where an employer may interfere with benefits. However, that does not
mean that Congress meant to limit section 510's protections to that
narrow context. In fact, if one wanted to take such a narrow reading
to the extreme, one might note that, at the time of the floor debates,
ERISA permitted employers to delay vesting until the employee at-
tained age thirty. Congress ultimately adopted an age limitation of
twenty-five, and later reduced it to age twenty-one. The examples in
the legislative history, however, provide that section 510 prohibits ter-
minations as a participant approaches age thirty. It would be absurd to
infer from this legislative history that a participant is not entitled to
protection under section 510 until almost age thirty. Yet the argument
is not dissimilar to the argument that section 510 protects only vested
benefits because the examples in the legislative history refer to vesting.
Also, the West court cited only a general statement regarding
section 511 and those sections of the section 510 legislative history that
focused on employee discharges. 253 The court did not cite, let alone
251 Id. at 245-46.
M illis focus on the employment relationship likely resulted from the facts of the case.
However, a number of cases have focused exclusively on whether a termination of employment
has occurred in the same way that courts have focused on vesting. See, e.g., Haberern v. Kaupp
Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 24 F.3d 1491, 1503 (3d Cir. 1994) (em-
ployer "actions [must) affect[) the employer-employee relationship"); McGath v. Auto-Body N.
Shore, Inc., 7 F.3c1 665, 668 (7th Cir. 1993) (focus of § 510 protections is on the employment
relationship). But see Aronson v. Servos Rubber, Div. of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.)
(under certain circumstances a plan termination could violate § 510), crrt. denied, 469 U.S. 1017
(1984); Newton v. Van Otterloo, 756 F. Supp. 1121, 1136 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (retaliatory reduction
in benefits might violate § 510). One student commentator has argued that the focus on the
employment relationship constitutes an overly narrow interpretation of the statute. Carl A. Greci,
Note, Use It And Lose It: The Employer's Absolute Right Under ER/SA Section 510 To Engage in
Post-Claim Modifications of Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, 68 IND. L.J. 177, 195-96 (1992). A focus
that ignores the statute's use of the term "discrimination" does appear unreasonably narrow;
however, a complete analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
253 621 F.2d at 243 (citing H.R. CONF. REP, No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)).
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attempt to reconcile: (1) the conference report's assertion that section
510 protects against interference with a participant's ability to attain
"any rights"; (2) the statements by Senator Williams in introducing the
conference report to the Senate that ERISA prohibited interference
with a participant's "attainment of vested benefits or other rights under
the bill . . . ' 1 ; 254 or (3)) the implication in the discussion of the fourteen
basic rights protected by ERISA that the coverage of section 510 ex-
tends beyond the vesting of benefits.255 Although these three portions
of the legislative history merit significant weight, coming as they do at
the end of the legislative process, the West court ignores them. This
selective use of the legislative history only makes sense if the West
opinion is addressing the need for either a discharge or harassment to
occur, and not the issue of whether a vested plaintiff is protected.
In addition, the court viewed the reduction in employer contribu-
tions as the underlying concern of the SLU trustees. 256 The level of
contributions in no way affects whether benefits vest in the type of plan
at issue; instead, contribution levels affect funding. If it seriously be-
lieved the protections of section 510 extend only to vesting of benefits,
the West court could simply have held that the decrease in contribu-
tions did not affect benefit vesting and, thus, section 510 did not apply
to the facts at hand. Instead, the court based its decision on a lack of
interference with the employment relationship. 257 Thus, the courts in
cases such as Donohue and Malone misread West when they interpreted
West as holding that only unvested participants are entitled to state a
claim under section 510. 255
e. Implications for Employers and Vested Participants
Reading section 510 to protect employees from interference with
their right to earn benefit accruals comports with Congress's intent to
afford significant protections under ERISA to employee benefit plan
participants. Interpreting the Interference Clause as protecting partici-
pants' rights to earn additional accruals also protects against a possible
avoidance scheme. For example, an employer could simply vest em-
ployees in their benefits shortly after hiring. 259 If the right to earn
254 120 CONC. Rae. 529,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams) (emphasis added).
255 1d. at 529,955 (statement of Sen. Williams).
256 West, 621 F.2d at 246,
257 Id.
258 See also Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 908 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (because
additional accruals increase the value of vested pensions, Want's reference to "obtaining vested
pension rights" means § 510 does protect accruals) (quoting West v. Butler, 621 F.2d at 245)
(emphasis in Clark Equipment).
259 ERISA's vesting requirements are minimum requirements; an employer may adopt a
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accruals were not protected, an employee fired to prevent receipt of a
larger pension benefit would have no claim under section 510 because
he was already vested. 260
A number of courts have recognized the incongruity of according
vested participants less protection than unvested participants. 261 In
addition, protecting participants' rights to earn accruals comports with
the general practice of protecting participants' rights to become eligi-
ble for enhanced levels of benefits such as Continental Can's Rule of
70/75 program. 262
 As a technical matter, ERISA does not impose any
special vesting requirements on those enhanced benefit programs.
However, interpreting section 510 as protecting the right to earn ad-
ditional accruals provides a sound analytical basis for protecting the
right of participants to earn enhanced benefits. 2"
This does not mean, though, that section 510's protections are
without limitation. Every termination of employment or plant closing
does not violate section 510 just because the discharge effectively
denies the former employee the right to earn additional benefit accru-
als. Section 510 only protects against specific acts taken for the purpose
of interfering with a participant's attainment of a benefit right. As
indicated above, to state a claim under section 510 a plaintiff must
prove the employer acted with the specific intent to interfere with the
plaintiff's ben efi ts. 264
Some courts have confused this "specific intent" requirement with
the issue of whether section 510 protects vested employees. For exam-
ple, in Malone v. Gilman Paper Co. the court sua sponte determined that
"a long line of cases" concludes that section 510 does not protect vested
participants. 265 The Malone court then quoted the following passage:
Plaintiff does not dispute that his pension rights had vested,
but rather asserts that defendant terminated him to prevent
schedule that provides for vesting more quickly than ERISA's requirements. See ERISA § 203, 29
U.S.C. § 1053 (1988 Sc Supp. IV 1992).
263 Collingsworth, supra note 132, at 327.
261
 Clark v. Resistollex Co., Div. of Unidynamics, 854 F.2d 762, 770 (5th Cir. 1988); Kross v.
Western Eke. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir. 1983); Marcoz v. Summa Corp., 801 P.2d 1346,
1352 (Nev. 1990).
262 See supra text accompanying notes 114-30. But seeSangeniti v. Mutual of Am., No. 90-3558,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16809 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1993) (distinguishing between enhanced early
retirement benefits and "normal" accruals).
Because there is a clear line when the employee becomes eligible for an enhanced benefits
program, just as there is when the employee becomes vested initially, a discharge just before
becoming eligible for an enhanced benefits program should be evidence of prohibited employer
intent just as it is evidence in the context of vesting. See infra text accompanying notes 270-73.
264
 See supra text accompanying note 67.
265 737 F. Supp. 88, 89 (S.D. Ga. 1990).
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him from qualifying for [the larger benefits he would receive
if he had retired at age sixty-five] .... The only evidence offered
by plaintiff is that if he had not been terminated, he would
have been able to accrue additional benefits. It is undisputed
that no benefits previously earned would have been forfeited
by reason of the discharge. Thus, regardless of whether the
discharge was arbitrary and capricious, its impact on benefits
was only incidental—the resulting loss was simply that which
would result from any discharge, i.e. a loss of wages and other
benefits earned on account of work to be performed in the
future . 266
Based in part on this quote, the Malone court decided that section
510 does not protect a vested plaintiff. This review of the sufficiency of
the plaintiff's evidence bears directly on the determination of whether
the plaintiff has stated a prima fade case. However, it has absolutely
nothing to do with the issue of whether section 510 protects vested
plaintiffs.
The basis for the confusion between the specific intent require-
ment and the application of section 510 to vested plaintiffs apparently
arises from the statement that the termination of employment has only
an incidental effect on benefits. To the extent that the court used the
word "incidental" to indicate that the loss of future benefits was a result
of the termination and not a motivating factor, that goes to the issue
of intent. And to the extent that the court used the word "incidental"
to reflect a belief that participants have little left to gain once their
benefits have vested, the statement often proves incorrect because
accruals in the final years of employment typically have a significant
effect on benefits in a defined benefit plan.267 Moreover, even if the
effect on benefits is only incidental, section 510 prohibits interference
with "the attainment of any right," 268 not just with the attainment of
substantial rights. Some courts have committed essentially the same
error in determining that section 510 cannot apply to the termination
of a vested participant because nearly every such employment termi-
nation prevents the participant from earning future accruals."9 Again,
this is important in determining whether the employee has proven the
266 Id, at 90 (quoting Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315,1318-19
(N.D. Cal. 1984)) (emphasis added).
2" See supra text accompanying notes 53-56; 2 BOREN, SUPTR note 46, at § 16:13.
26 ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
269 see, e.g., Kelly v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 717 F. Supp. 227,232 (S.D.N.Y, 1989); Corum v.
Farm Credit Servs., 628 F. Supp. 707,717-18 (D. Minn. 1986).
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necessary specific intent on the part of the employer but is irrelevant
in determining the scope of protection of section 510.
Correctly understood, the specific intent requirement protects an
employer from having to litigate every employment discharge. Where
employees suffer discharge just prior to vesting, a prototypical section
510 situation, 2" the proximity in time alone provides important evi-
dence of prohibited intent on the part of the employer."' Similarly, a
discharge just prior to attainment of eligibility for an enhanced benefit
often evidences an intent to interfere with the attainment of a benefit
right. Where vested employees claim interference with their right to
earn additional accruals, however, the discharge alone does not help
prove prohibited employer conduct. 272
 Otherwise, almost every single
employment termination could result in a trial under section 510
because working for a longer time almost always results in the accrual
of greater benefits. Instead, the employee must present evidence other
than the mere fact of the termination in order to avoid summary
judgment. 272
In sum, the protections of section 510 extend to the right to
accrue benefits and the right to meet plan criteria for enhanced
benefits as well as to the right to vest in benefits. In each case the
employee must show specific intent. However, differences exist in the
probative value of the employment termination to prove an employer's
malevolent intent.
C. Application of Section 510 to Welfare Benefits
This Part began by explaining the general application of the
Exercise Clause and the Interference Clause. Next, this Part examined
the issue of whether the protections of section 510 extend beyond the
right to become vested and concluded that they extend to the right to
earn additional accruals and to meet the criteria for enhanced bene-
fits. This section briefly analyzes the application of section 510 to
welfare benefits in order to ensure consistency with the protections
accorded to pension benefits.
270
	 supra text accompanying notes 168-71.
271
 Technically this evidence becomes important to the employee's prima facie case. See infra
text accompanying note 314 for a brief discussion of the current requirements of a prima facie case.
"2 See, e.g, Titsch v. Reliance Group, 548 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd without
opinion, 742 F.2d 1441 (2d Cir. 1983).
273 See, e.g., Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335, 347-48 (3d Cir. 1990); Johnson
v. United Airlines, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 1425, 1432-33 (D. Haw. 1987); Baker v. Kaiser Aluminum
& Chem. Corp., 608 F. Supp. 1315, 1319 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
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The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced the question of whether
the Interference Clause protects a participant's right to continued
welfare benefits in Kross v. Western Electric Co. 274 Kross brought a class
action lawsuit resulting from a substantial reduction in workforce at
Western Electric's Hawthorne Works facility. 275 Like the courts that
believe the Interference Clause protects only the right to become
vested, the district court decided that Kross's termination did not
prevent him from attaining benefits under the welfare benefit plans,
because he participated in those plans when discharged. 276 The Sev-
enth Circuit reversed, believing the language and the remedial nature
of the statute requires that interference with continued participation
in welfare benefit plans is covered by section 510.277 Likewise, at least
one circuit has held that an employer may not fire an employee to
prevent that employee from taking part in the employer's health care
plan.278 just as in pension plan cases, the plaintiff must prove that the
employer took the employment action at issue with the specific intent
of interfering with benefit entitlements. 279
Recently, plaintiffs have attempted unsuccessfully to use both the
Interference and the Exercise Clauses to challenge reductions in their
medical insurance plans. For example, in McGann v. H & H Music
Co.,28° the employer reduced the lifetime cap in its health insurance
plan from $1 million to $5,000 for expenses related to AIDS shortly
after learning that one of its employees had contracted AIDS. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the employer's claim that its moti-
vation was to reduce the costs of its health care plan and that it. was
not impermissibly targeting McGann because the reduction applied to
all employees who might file AIDS-related claims. 281 The court distin-
274 701 F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir. 1983).
275 1d. at 1239.
276 /d. at 1241. The Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of Kross's pension benefit claims
because Kross failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing suit under ERISA.
/d. at 1245.
2" Id at 1241-46. The Seventh Circuit also recognized that failure to extend the coverage
of § 510 to participants in welfare benefit plans would result in less protection for vested employees
than for probationary employees. Id. at 1243; see also Massie v. Indiana Gas Co., 752 F. Supp. 261,
269 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (employee discharged in order to avoid costs under short term disability
plan entitled to protection under § 510).
275 Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 545 (11th Cir.) (the court relied upon the
Exercise Clause), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 308 (1993).
27th
	 v. Field Real Estate Co., 991 F.2d 645, 649-50 (10th Cir. 1993),
280 946 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
28/ Id. at 405-08; see also Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394, 398-99 (11th Cir. 1993).
For additional commentary on employer's rights to modify health care plans in order to contain
costs with respect to HIV/AIDS, see T.J. Dorsey, Recent Developments, McCann v. H & H Music
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guished Vogel v. Independence Federal Savings Bank,282 where the em-
ployer impermissibly excluded only Vogel from coverage under its
health insurance plan. 288 Finally, the Fifth Circuit recognized that ERISA
does not require an employer to offer any health insurance and per-
mits an employer to amend or eliminate the voluntary plans it has
chosen to offer if the employer has reserved its right to amend or
eliminate the plan.2"
These applications of section 510 in the welfare benefit plan con-
text are consistent with section 510's application, discussed above, 285 to
pension plan claims. The courts hold that section 510 prohibits an
employer from firing an employee to interfere with the employee's
welfare benefits. Furthermore, that protection extends to employment
actions that affect groups of employees. In contrast, section 510 does
not generally prevent an employer from terminating or amending a
welfare benefit plan. Finally, since the concept of statutory vesting does
not apply to welfare benefits, the application of section 510 in these
cases supports the conclusion that the protections of section 510 ex-
tend beyond vesting.
IV. PROOF OF A SECTION 510 CLAIM
Part II of this Article concludes that the protections of section 510
should extend to plant closing situations. Part Ill of this Article argues
that the types of benefits covered by section 510 include an employee's
right to earn future benefit accruals and meet plan criteria for en-
hanced benefits as well as the employee's right to become vested in
benefits. Thus, an employer cannot close a plant and fire employees
to interfere with the rights of the employees to accrue benefits or to
become entitled to enhanced benefits. However, a plant closing does
not violate section 510 simply because it has the result of interfering
with employee benefits or saving the employer money through re-
duced benefit costs. Instead, an employer violates section 510 only
where it closes a plant with the specific intent to interfere with the
attainment of employee benefits. This Part will address briefly the
nature of a plaintiff's burden of proof in a section 510 case by explain-
ing the standards for Title VII cases and examining the way courts
Co.: The Limited Meaning of "Discrimination" Under Section 510 of ERISA, 67 Tim. L. REV. 305
(1992); Greci, supra note 209; James M. Smith, HIV/AIDS and Workplace Discrimination: Dickens
Revisited—"It was the Best of Times, It was the Worst of Times," 22 U. WEST. L.A. L. REV. 19 (1991);
James R. Bruner, Note, AIDS and ERISA Preemption: The Double Threat, 41 DUKE L.J. 1115 (1992).
282 728 F. Supp. 1210, 1225 (D. Md. 1990).
283 McGann, 946 F.2d at 405.
284
 Id, at 405-08.
285 See supra parts III.A and 111.B.
March 1995]	 PLANT CLOSINGS AND EllISA	 243
currently apply those standards in section 510 cases. This Part con-
cludes by questioning the remedies available in a section 510 action
after the 1993 Supreme Court decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates. 28"
A. Title VII Burdens and Their Application to Section 510 Cases
As recognized by the court in Levi Strauss & Co.,287 to state a valid
section 510 claim, a plaintiff "must show the employer had the 'specific
intent to violate ERISA.'" However, because plaintiffs can rarely obtain
direct—or "smoking gun"—evidence to prove a section 510 claim,
plaintiffs may use circumstantial evidence to prove a claim. Generally,
in section 510 cases where the plaintiffs rely on circumstantial evi-
dence, the courts purportedly apply the burden-shifting standards es-
tablished by the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine288 and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green's" for Title
VII disparate treatment cases. 29°
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court outlined the four ele-
ments of a plaintiffs prima facie case in a Title VII disparate treatment
claim for discriminatory failure to hire. 291 First, the plaintiff must be-
long to a protected class. 292 Second, the plaintiff must have applied and
been qualified for the job opening sought to be filled by the defen-
dant. 293 Third, the defendant must have rejected the plaintiff. 294 Fourth,
the defendant must have continued to solicit applications from indi-
viduals with similar qualifications for the same job for which the plain-
tiff applied. 295 However, the McDonnell Douglas Court made it clear that
the prima facie case may vary depending on the factual situation of the
case at issue. 296 In fact, a number of different elements have emerged
depending on the nature of the Title VII case. 297
288 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
287 Unida v. Levi Strauss & Co., 986 F.2d 970, 980-81 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Clark v.
Resistoflex Co., 854 F.2d 762, 770 (5th Cir. 1988)); see also Kapetantwich v. Rockwell Intl, Inc.,
15 Employee Benefits Gas. (BNA) 2580, 2582 (3d Cir. 1992); Cavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812
F.2d 834, 851-52 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 (1987), later proceeding sub nom. McLendon
v. Continental Group, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N,). 1992).
288 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981).
289 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973).
299 See, e.g., Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 851-52 (presence of circumstantial evidence calls for appli-
cation of McDonnell Douglas test).
291





298 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
297 See, e.g., Roberts v. Gadsden Memorial Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 796(discrimination in promo-
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The Supreme Court decided in Burdine that a plaintiff initially has
the burden to prove a prima facie case by a preponderance of the
evidence. 298
 Once the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie
case, the plaintiff receives a presumption that the defendant discrimi-
nated against the plaintiff. 299
 The defendant then bears the burden of
producing evidence of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"" for
the defendant's action. Production of such evidence by the defendant
eliminates the presumption in favor of the plaintiff."' The plaintiff
then has an opportunity to prove the defendant's asserted reason was
not the actual motivation for the challenged employment decision.
The plaintiff's burden of proof "merges with the ultimate burden of
persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional dis-
crimination."12
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the Supreme Court clarified
the application of the Burdine standard to cases where the defendant
produces evidence of a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the
defendant's actions but the trier of fact rejects that evidence as not
being credible."' One of the key phrases at issue was the "merger"
language from Burdine, quoted above." According to the Supreme
Court, even where the defendant's evidence is not credible, the plain-
tiff loses the benefit of the presumption of discrimination. On the
other hand, the rejection of the defendant's stated reason for the
employment action does "permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate
fact of intentional discrimination."305 This decision has spawned sig-
nificant criticism300
 and legislation has been introduced to counteract
the holding."
rim), modified, 850 E2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1988); Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2(1 1380, 1383 (9th Cir.
1984) (prima fade case for discriminatory constructive discharge); Cockrham v. South Cent. Bell
Tel. Co., 695 F.2d 143, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1982) (discriminatory discharge due to unequal discipline).




 Id. at 255.
3V2 Id. at 255-56. The quoted language was at the center of the dispute in St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993); see infra notes 303-07 and accompanying text.
909 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2745-47 (1993). However, the Court split 5-4 on the outcome. Hicks
involved the demotion and later discharge of an African-American correctional officer. Id. at
2746. Once the trier of fact decided that the defendants' stated reasons for the demotion and
discharge were pretextual, the Eighth Circuit determined that the plaintiff was entitled to win as
a flatter of law. Id. at 2748. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ultimate burden of
proof remains at all times with the plaintiff so the plaintiff may only win if the plaintiff proves
intentional discrimination. Id. at 2749-54.
314 See supra text accompanying note 302.
3113
 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
34}11 See, e.g., The Supreme Court—Leading Cases, 107 Hidtv. L. REV. 144, 342-52 (1993).
3°7 H,R. 2867, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2787, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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Finally, a Title VII plaintiff may raise a so-called "mixed motive"
claim."' Mixed motive cases occur where the defendant had a legiti-
mate as well as an illegal motive for the discriminatory employment
action. A plurality of the Supreme Court decided in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins" that the Burdinestandard of proof does not apply to mixed
motive cases. Instead, the Supreme Court required the employer to
prove, by the preponderance of the evidence, that the employer would
have made the same employment decision in the absence of the illegal
motive.") Thus, the burden of persuasion, instead of simply the burden
of production, shifted to the defendant. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 3"
("CRA") essentially reinstituted the standard of proof that existed in
the case law prior to Price Waterhouse. Under the CRA, a plaintiff
establishes violation of Title VII upon proof that a prohibited criteria
was "a motivating factor." 12
As in the context of Title VII, plaintiffs alleging a violation of section
510 sometimes cannot produce direct, or "smoking gun," evidence of
an intent to deprive the plaintiff of benefits. Therefore, where the
evidence is circumstantial, numerous courts have applied the McDon-
nell Douglas framework. The nature of the prima facie case in a section
510 action, however, has been refined over recent years. Initially, intent
appeared as an element of the prima facie case.'" As a result, the
framework did little or nothing to aid a plaintiff in proving the requi-
site intent. Generally, the prima facie case now consists of: (i) mem-
bership in a class protected by ERISA; (ii) qualification for the job; and
(iii) discharge under circumstances that would tend to lead one to
believe that a protected characteristic supplied the basis for the deci-
sion.'"
If the plaintiff proves the employer based its employment decision
upon both a permissible and a prohibited reason, the analysis becomes
more difficult. In USX,''' the employer argued that even if a prohibited
308 1n addition to mixed motive and disparate treatment cases, plaintiffs may bring claims
under theories of disparate treatment class action or disparate impact class action. See SCHLEI &
GROSSMAN, SUPra note 97, at 1230-34 & Supp. at 170-71.
309 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989).
31 ° Id. at 253.
311 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
312 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). However, relief for violations of this
section of Title VII is limited to declaratory relief, certain injunctive relief, and attorney's fees
and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2)(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
313 Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 949
(1987), later proceeding sub nom. McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N.J.
1992).
314
	 e.g., Kapetanovich v. Rockwell Intl, Inc., 15 Employee Benefits Cas, (BNA) 2580,
2582-83 (1992).
315 Pickering v. USX Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1501, 1533 n.18 (D. Utah 1992).
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reason contributed to its decision to close Geneva, it had the right to
defend on the ground that it would have closed the plant anyway. The
court dismissed this argument as inconsistent with the McDonnell Douglas
fratnework. 3 ' 6
In contrast, the courts in Gavaliks' 7 and McLendon,''s would have
permitted the employer to defend by proving that the plaintiffs "'would
have suffered the same loss of work even in the absence of the illegal
plan.'"m Essentially the courts in Gavalik and McLendon followed the
evidentiary standards set forth by the plurality in Price Waterhouse.
Although the CRA changed that standard for Title VII actions, it had
no effect on ERISA actions. Thus, in section 510 cases where a plaintiff
proves that employers acted for permissible and impermissible reasons,
case law in at least some circuits permits the employer to defend by
proving that it would have taken the same action even in the absence
of the prohibited motive. 320
When faced with section 510 claims, the courts traditionally have
looked to the evidentiary standards developed under Title VII. This
pattern is beginning to disintegrate as Congress has modified the
standards under Title VII without making corresponding changes to
ERISA. It is too early to tell whether this will result in diverging
frameworks for burdens of proof under the two statutes. The com-
plexity of burden of proof issues, combined with the general complex-
ity of ERISA actions, makes it difficult to believe that litigation will
achieve uniformity in the near future. However, additional statutory
refinement of ERISA became far more likely after the 1993 Supreme
Court decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associatesui discussed in the next
section.
316
317 Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 834.
318 McLendon v. Continental Can Co., 908 F.2d 1171 (3d Cir. 1990), later proceeding sub nom.
McLendon v. Continental Group, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N.J. 1992).
319 Id. at 1178 (quoting Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 866) (emphasis added by the McLendon court);
see also Nemeth v. Clark Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 909 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (no § 510 violation
because consideration of the pension costs was not determinative in Clark's decision to close the
Benton Harbor plant). But see, e.g., Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (D.
Kan. 1993) (a § 510 plaintiff need not show that she would have received benefits "but for" the
employer's action). A resolution of the standard of proof in mixed motive cases is beyond the
scope of this Article.
32° Given the concerns that prompted Congress to "reverse" Price Waterhouse by enacting the
CRA, the issue of what the appropriate standards are for § 510 mixed motive cases deserves more
attention. When combined with the question of whether the cases under § 510 should even look
to Title VII, these queries go beyond the scope of this Article.
321 1 1 3 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
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B. Remedies
In 1993 the Supreme Court limited the scope of relief available to
remedy violations of ERISA. 322
 This section reviews the relevant statu-
tory provision and its historical application before turning to a discus-
sion of the decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.s 2" The section ends
by addressing the post-Mertens outlook for remedies for section 510
claims.
While section 510 contains substantive prohibitions, it is not self-
enforcing. Instead, enforcement must occur under ERISA section 502
("section 502") 324 which contains ERISA's general enforcement provi-
sions. Section 502 provides a variety of remedies, depending on the
nature of the claim being raised and the status of the party bringing
the claim. A number of gaps exist in those enforcement provisions and
Congress intended the development of a federal common law to sup-
plement ERISA.325 Rather than fill the gaps, lower courts have routinely
adopted the Supreme Court's statement in Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Company v. Russell,"" that Congress carefully drafted section
502 to provide a systematic remedial scheme. Relying upon that state-
ment, courts frequently have refused to permit remedies not explicitly
authorized by section 502. 527
For purposes of a section 510 claim, the most relevant portions of
section 502 are subsections (a) (1) and (a) (3). Section 502(a) (1) per-
mits participants or beneficiaries to bring suit:
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this
section [regarding information and disclosure violations], or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan; . . .328
According to section 502(a) (3), a civil suit may be brought:
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any
act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the
322 See id.
:325 m
324 ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (amended 1993).
325 See Conison, supra note 22, at 6-8 (arguing that § 502 establishes an imprecise and
unsystematic civil enforcement system).
526 473 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1985).
327 See, e.g., Conison, supra note 22, at 7-8.
528 ERISA § 502(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (1988 & Supp, IV 1992).
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terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this title or the terms of the plan; . . . 
. 329
Because sections 510 and 502 are both part of Title I of ERISA, it
is natural to rely upon section 502(a) (3)'s grant of a cause of action
for a violation of "any provision of this title."'" Subsection (A) limits
relief to injunctive relief. In contrast, subsection (B) offers a wider
variety of remedies by permitting "other appropriate equitable re-
lief.""' Some early section 510 commentators relied upon the broad
goals set forth in the legislative history to recommend that courts read
this phrase as permitting all types of relief that might be available in
equity, including monetary relief, and at least one commentator rec-
ommended punitive awards in appropriate cases. 332
A few early cases cited ERISA's remedial purpose and Congress's
intent to provide "the full range of legal and equitable remedies avail-
able in both state and federal courts"" 3 as authority permitting the
award of a variety of remedies. For example, some courts indicated that
a plaintiff who suffered termination in violation of section 510 could
recover back pay, 334
 reinstatement,'" front pay, 336
 reinstatement of lost
benefits, 337 and pre-judgment interest. 338
 A few courts also stated that
punitive damages would be available in appropriate cases. 339 Other
courts permitted plaintiffs to recover using estoppel theories. 340
The Supreme Court added some support for a broad interpreta-
tion of section 502(a) (3) in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon. 34 ' In a
unanimous opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Court deter-
329




 Collingsworth, supra note 132, at 348; see also Martucci & Utz, supra note 132, at 262-64;
Vogel, supra note 132, at 1047, 1053-54.
353 14.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1973), 7i-hinted in 1974 U.S.S.CA.N. 4639,
4655.
334
 Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1016-17 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Bluster v. Sadoff
Rudoy Indus., 490 F. Supp. 534, 536 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
335 Fo/z., 594 F. Supp. at 1018; Bittner, 490 F. Supp. at 536.
33° Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1018; Bittner, 490 F. Supp. at 536.
337 FOIZ, 594 F. Stipp. at 1019-20; Milner, 490 F. Supp. at 536.
"1 Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1217 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
968 (1981); Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1016-17.
339 Bittner, 490 F. Supp. at 536; Baeten v. Van Ess, 474 F. Supp. 1324, 1331 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(discussing damages available under § 502(a) (3) in the context of flagrant and malicious actions
by the trustees). This position was discredited by all circuit courts that examined the issue, See,
e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2077 n.6 (White,,., dissenting).
540 See, e.g., Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 114-16 (7th Cir. 1990). But see, e.g., Coleman
V. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 58-60 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1051 (1993).
34 ' 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
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mined that ERISA pre-empted a former employee's common law claim
for unlawful discharge where the employer allegedly fired the em-
ployee in order to prevent him from vesting in the employer's pension
plan.342
 The plaintiff sought "'lost future wages, mental anguish and
punitive damages as a result of the wrongful discharge." 43 Justice
O'Connor wrote that ERISA would pre-empt this cause of action even
in the absence of its broad pre-emption clause because the state law
claim directly conflicted with the federal prohibitions contained in
section 510. 3" In discussing the remedies available for a section 510
violation, Justice O'Connor then stated: "It is clear that the relief
requested here is well within the power of federal courts to provide." 345
Some courts have taken Justice O'Connor at her word and have con-
cluded that section 502(a) (3) permits the award of "extra-contractual,
even punitive, damages." 346
 Other courts have determined that Justice
O'Connor's statement regarding the availability of remedies was un-
clear and constituted dicta. Accordingly, those courts have refused to
permit punitive or extracontractual remedies. 347
In its 1993 decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,m the Supreme
Court limited the types of remedies available under section 502(a) (3).
In Mertens, pension plan participants sued Hewitt Associates ("Hewitt")
after their employer phased out its steel operations, leaving an under-
funded pension plan that could not provide promised benefits. 349 The
participants believed that Hewitt, as actuary to the plan, breached a
variety of ERISA duties by permitting the employer to select the actu-
arial assumptions for the plan and by failing to disclose either the
funding deficiency or the employer's status as a client of Hewitt."° As
relief, the participants asked that Hewitt contribute the amount neces-
sary to fully fund the plan so they could receive the promised ben-
efits."' The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the narrow ques-
342 /d. at 144,
343 id. at 136 (quoting McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69, 71 rt.3 (Tex. 1989)).
344 Id. at 142,
343 Id. at 145.
346 Blue Cross 8c Blue Shield v. Lewis, 753 F. Supp. 345, 347 (N.D. Ma, 1990) ("being willing
to attribute literacy to the Supreme Court"), supp. opinion, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56 (N.D. Ala.
Jan. 3, 1991), /tiler proceeding, 754 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
347 See, e.g., McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819, 821 n.7 (11th Cir, 1991).
343 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
34`3
	 at 2065. Because of insufficient plan assets, the PBGC used its authority under ERISA
to terminate the plan. The PBGC benefit guarantees then applied to the plan participants.
However, many of the plaintiffs had elected to take early retirement, and the benefits promised
to them by the pension plan were substantially higher than the PBGC guarantees. Id. The
participants also brought suit against plan fiduciaries. Id.
350
361 Id. at 2067.
250	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 36:203
tion of whether money damages are available under section 502 (a) (3)
"against nonfiduciaiies who knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach
of fiduciary duty."352
In determining the availability of money damages under section
502(a) (3), the Court focused on the phrase "appropriate equitable
relief."'" The participants contended that the losses to the plan con-
stituted appropriate equitable relief because equity courts could pro-
vide such relief through the common law of trusts before ERISA.
Writing for the five-to-four majority, Justice Scalia admitted that the
phrase "equitable relief' could mean "whatever relief a court of equity
is empowered to provide in the particular case at issue."354 However,
the majority determined that because of the context of the provision,
the term "equitable relief" in section 502 (a) (3) (B) takes on the alter-
native meaning of "those categories of relief that were typically available
in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not
compensatory damages)."355
 In coming to this conclusion, the majority
compared other areas of ERISA where Congress distinguished between
"equitable" and "remedial" relief or between "equitable" and "legal"
relief."6
 The majority also noted that reading section 502(a) (3) to
preclude compensatory damages comports with its interpretation of
similar language in Title VII. 357
 And because the Court viewed the
participants' request for payment of plan losses as a request for com-
pensatory damages, "the classic form of legal relief,"35" the Court up-
held the decision of the court of appeals that ERISA did not permit
such relief. 359
Justice White wrote a strong dissent, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justices Stevens and O'Connor. The dissent argued that Congress
intended ERISA to incorporate the common law of trust and that trust
law militated for a broad definition of "equitable relief' in section
502(a) (3). 36° The dissent also believed it inappropriate to interpret
ERISA in a way that would cause participants to receive less protection
under ERISA than they enjoyed under the common law of trusts—an
outcome that the dissent termed an "atiomaly." 36 ' Finally, the dissent
332 Id. at 2066.
A"Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2067.
331 Id. at 2068-69.
333 Id. at 2069 (emphasis in original). Attorney fees and costs are also available, usually at the
court's discretion, for actions under ERISA. ERISA § 502(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (1988).
336 Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2070-71.
337 Id. at 2068.
338 Id. (emphasis in original).
632 Id. at 2072.
360 Id. at 2073.
361 Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2074.
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argued that the context did not require such a narrow construction of
the phrase "appropriate equitable relief" and that Congress did not
always utilize great precision in its wording of remedial provisions.362
Many commentators and courts agree that section 502(a) (3), the
provision at issue in Mertens, provides the basis for suits alleging a
violation of section 510. 3" In Mlle v. Carroll Touch, Inc.,'" for example,
Tolle claimed, inter alia, that Carroll Touch, Inc. terminated her em-
ployment to deprive her of benefits in violation of section 510. In
determining the appropriate statute of limitations, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals decided that section 502(a) (1)(B) essentially pro-
vides relief for the breach of contractual rights under a benefit plan. 366
However, in order for such a breach to occur, a participant must have
satisfied the plan's requirements for receipt of such benefits. In con-
trast, the court found that section 502(a) (3) provides an avenue for
the redress of statutory violations.'" Thus, according to the Seventh
Circuit, sections 510 and 502(a) (3) protect a participant from em-
ployer actions "which might cut off or interfere with a participant's
ability to collect present or future benefits or which punish a partici-
pant for exercising his or her rights under an employee benefit plan." 367
To the extent the Mertens Court limited remedies available under
section 502(a) (3), the decision has important implications for suits
brought to challenge violations of section 510. Although Mertens was
decided in the context of the duties of nonfiduciaries and not as a
section 510 case, the Court's plain meaning approach appears to re-
quire application of Mertens' interpretation of section 502 (a) (3) to all
types of claims, including section 510 claims, brought under section
502(a) (3). 3438 In fact, as a fiduciary-type case, Mertens offered a stronger
argument for relying upon concepts developed under the common law
of trusts than would actions brought for violation of section 510 which
have no analogue in the common law of trusts. Thus, after Mertens, it
appears likely that section 502 (a) (3) will limit participants alleging a
562 Id. at 2075 11.4.
563 See, e.g., 2 BOREN, supra note 46, at § 16:13; Collingsworth, supra note 132, at 348; see also
Martucci & Utz, supra note 108, at 262-64; Vogel, supra note 132, at 1047, 1053-54.
r'`I 977 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992), summ„ j. on other grounds, 813 F. Supp. 1568 (C.D.
111. 1993), affd, 29 F.3d 174 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Custer v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d
410, 421 (4th Cir. 1993); Spinelli v. Gaughan, 12 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1993); Held v. Manufac-
turers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 1990); Bishop v. Osborn Transp.,
Inc., 838 F.2d 1173 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988).
565 Tolle, 977 F.2d at 1133.
366 Id. at 1133-34, 1139; see also Richards v. General Motors Corp., 850 E Supp. 1325, 1339-40
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (section 502(a) (3) provides the only remedy for a violation of § 510).
54'7 Tolle, 977 F.2d at 1134.
568 See Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit. Corp., No. 94-1060, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 18703, at
*6-7 (1st Cir. July 22, 1994); 2 BOREN, supra note 46, at § 16:13.
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violation of section 510 to traditional equitable remedies and will
preclude the recovery of compensatory damages.
Grounding a claim for a section 510 violation in another sub-
section of section 502 provides one way of avoiding this limitation.
section 502(a) (1)(B), however, which permits participants to recover,
enforce, or clarify benefits due under a benefit plan, appears to be the
only possible alternative. Some courts have stated that both sections
502 (a)(1)(B) and 502(a) (3) are available to remedy section 510 viola-
tions and the application of section 502(a) (1)(B) remains far from
settled.'"
The gist of a typical section 510 complaint is that an employer
took an action intended to prevent the plaintiff from becoming enti-
tled to plan benefits. 37° As the Tolle court recognized,'" a plaintiff
alleging that type of violation of the Interference Clause cannot state
a section 502(a) (1)(B) claim "to recover benefits due to him under
the terms of his plan"372
 because the plaintiff did not meet the require-
ments of the plan. Plaintiffs have advanced several theories to avoid
this problem. One plaintiff, for example, argued that the ability under
section 502(a) (1) (B) "to enforce . .. rights under the terms of the
plan" permits a cause of action to enforce the right to be free from
actions forbidden by section 510.'7' However, such an interpretation
fails to give meaning to the phrase "terms of the plan"; section 510
confers a statutory right not typically replicated in employee benefit
plans. 374
 And, section 502 (a) (1) (B) may authorize only the recovery of
plan benefits.
In sum, plaintiffs seeking remedies for section 510 violations are
likely left only with equitable remedies under section 502(a) (3). The
provisions permitting injunctive relief and restitution should permit a
" Babich v. Unisys Corp., No. 92-1473-MIB, 1994 WL 167984, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 8, 1994);
Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1283, 1290 (D. Kan. 1993).
37° But see. Richards v. General Motors Corp., 850 F. Supp. 1325, 1327-28 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(plaintiffs alleged that G.M. reduced benefits which the plaintiffs had earned under the plan and
relied on section 502(a) (1)(B)),
371 Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1133-34 (7th Cir. 1992).
372
 ER1SA § 502(a)(1) (8); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1)(B) (1988).
373 See Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647, 649 (3d Cir. 1990).
374 See id. But see Babich v. Unisys Corp., No. 92-I473-MLB, 1994 U.S. Dist. WESTLAW 167984
(D. Kan. Apr. 8, 1994). Babich addressed the nature of the § 502(a) (1) (B) in the context of the
availability of a jury trial in § 510 actions and determined that a § 510 plaintiff could seek
monetary damages under § 502(a) (1) (B) and termed the damages as "restitutionary in character
and therefore equitable in nature." Id. at *7. The availability of a jury trial is yet another issue
where the courts are split. See id. at *3-7. The Mertens determination that only traditional
equitable relief is available under § 502(a) (3) appears to preclude the availability of a jury trial
for actions predicated on that section.
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plaintiff who prevails in a section 510 action to obtain reinstatement
where practicable. A plaintiff might also obtain lost benefits under a
theory of restitution if the plaintiff's termination unjustly enriched the
employer. 375 Unjust enrichment, for example, arguably occurs where
the employer has established a pension plan with the expectation that
a given percentage of participants will meet the criteria for enhanced
benefits but the employer closes a plant to prevent the participants
from achieving entitlement for enhanced benefits. The amounts the
employer previously funded, or should have funded, to pay for en-
hanced benefits will reduce the employer's future plan funding liabil-
ity. Arguably, the employer is unjustly enriched at least to the extent
of this savings. However, it is difficult to predict how the courts will
treat these types of claims because few past ERISA cases have dealt with
traditional notions of unjust enrichment. 576
Also, section 510 plaintiffs may be left without other components
of a make-whole remedy because of questions regarding the availability
of items such as back pay and front pay.'" One commentator has stated:
"[Black pay seems on the surface to be an ordinary damages claim,
almost an exemplar of a claim at I aW. "378 In the absence of specific
provisions under other employment statutes, some courts agree and
have refused to classify back pay as equitable relief. For example, in
Waldrop v. Southern Co. Services, Inc., 379 a former employee alleged
violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 386 and
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"). 381 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that the
requested back pay failed to constitute restitution under the Rehabili-
375 See, e.g., Howe v. Variety Corp., 36 F.2d 746, 756-57 (8th Cir. 1994) (permitting restitu-
tionary awards of lost benefits over the objection of a strenuous dissent); Zinunerrnan v. Sloss
Equip., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (D. Kan. 1993) (referring to "restitution of forfeited
benefits"); see 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW or REMEDIES § 6.10(5) (1993) (extending this argument to
cover back pay).
376 See, e,g., jarnail, Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of Houston Pension & Welfare Trusts, 954
F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1992) (employer inadvertently made overpayments to a nmItiemployer
plan and sought to recover the excess contribution); Provident Lile & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller,
906 F.2d 985, 992 (4th Cir.) (an insurance company obtained a restitutionary recovery where a
participant received double payment of benefits), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 (1990).
377 See Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., No, 94-1060, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 18703, at
*6 (1st Cir. July 22, 1994). But see Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 835 F. Stipp. 1283, 1289 (D.
Kan. 1993). Zimmerman was decided after Mertens but states, without referring to the Mertens
decision, that courts have the "equitable power" to award full relief in § 510 cases.
378 2 DOBBS, supra note 375, at § 6:10(5).
373 24 F.3d 152, 154 (11th Cir. 1994).
m0 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. ry 1992).
381 Id. §§ 701-7961-6 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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tation Act because no unjust enrichment existed, as would have oc-
curred if the employer had failed to compensate plaintiff for time
actually worked.382
Unlike ERISA, Title VII specifically permits back pay. 383 In Title
VII actions, courts generally categorized back pay as equitable relief
for the purpose of questions of jury trial entitlement prior to the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. To reach that conclusion,
courts have relied on a variety of arguments, including the wording of
Title VII. Another theory is that back pay is available as incidental to
the injunctive remedy of reinstatement.m 4 Commentators, however, have
questioned the Title VII arguments as being inconsistent with the basic
compensatory nature of back pay claims, and it is unclear whether the
equitable categorization will be extended by analogy to ERISA.38  To
the extent the courts treat ERISA claims for items such as back pay as
compensatory damages, those types of relief would appear unavailable
after Mertens. The lack of such remedies for a successful section 510
plaintiff "seems anomalous, stripping Section 510 of its intended ef-
fect. "386
V. CONCLUSION
Employers faced with increasing competitive pressures and aging
plants undoubtedly will find themselves considering plant closings.
Given the significant costs associated with employee benefits, it is
natural and appropriate that employers are paying more attention to
the expenses associated with employee benefits. However, section 510
of ERISA contains important limitations on an employer's ability to
avoid benefit obligations.
This Article began with background on ERISA and relevant bene-
fit plan concepts. It then examined two of the recent plant closing
decisions in detail. One issue is whether section 510 should even apply
to large scale employment decisions such as plant closings. This Article
concludes that Congress intended section 510 to preclude employer
actions taken for the purpose of preventing plan participants from
gaining entitlement to promised benefits. It would be anomalous to
382 Waldrop, 24 F.3d at 159.
'83 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Stipp. IV 1992). But see Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 793 F.
Stipp. 284, 286 (D. Kan. 1992) (designating a § 510 claim as an equitable claim by analogizing
it to a Title VII claim).
384 See, e.g., Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 571 (1989); Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665
F.2d 918, 929 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); 2 Doans, supra note 375, at § 6:10(5).
885 See, e.g., 2 Dorms, supra note 375, at § 6:10(5).
586 See 2 BOREN, supra note 46, at § 16:13,
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protect participants from individually targeted actions while permitting
equivalent actions so long as they affect large numbers of participants.
That conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry. The next
question becomes, what type of benefits does section 510 protect? The
benefits issue has caused considerable controversy in the courts. This
Article concludes that the disagreement arises in large part from a
misreading of early case law and a failure to distinguish between the
scope of section 510 and the separate need to prove specific intent.
This Article concludes that section 510 protects a vested participant's
right to accrue additional benefits and earn entitlement to enhanced
benefits as well as an unvested participant's right to become vested.
In proving intent, the courts traditionally have looked to frame-
works for allocating the burden of proof that have developed under
Title VII jurisprudence. Those analogies, whether or not they were
correct, are beginning to break down as Congress has modified Title
VII but has left section 510 untouched. At the same time the courts
currently are struggling with the import of the Supreme Court's 1993
opinion in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates387 which limited relief to tradi-
tional equitable remedies. After Mertens the remedies of prevailing
section 510 plaintiffs may be limited to job reinstatement and perhaps
lost benefits. Although such an interpretation would eviscerate the
protections of section 510, it appears questionable whether a prevailing
plaintiff can recover all categories of relief necessary to obtain make-
whole relief. Thus, although the protections of section 510 may tech-
nically prohibit a wide variety of employer actions, ERISA may not offer
effective relief to wronged participants.
387 113 S. Ct. 2063 (1993).
